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ABSTRACT 
The unity of Plato's Symposium is its continuity. There are a number of 
themes and threads of continuity throughout the dialogue which 
dialectically progress from beginning to end. These threads of continuity 
are drawn out and examined in relation to one another to fonn a 
complete and coherent doctrine of love. Chapter 1 examines the first five 
speeches, each of which rhetorically presents the nature and function of 
love. Chapter 2 demonstrates how these rhetorical notions are drawn 
together and grounded dialectically by the speech of Socrates. In Chapter 
3 the speech of Alcibiades is examined with particular reference to how 
Alcibiades' account of the conduct of Socrates reflects and demonstrates 
the proper conduct of the lover as it has been dialectically grounded in 
Socrates' speech. 'lbe nature and function of love unfolds throughout the 
dialogue in a movement from the implicit to the explicit, and from 
rhetoric to dialectic. The speeches, taken as a whole, express the 
dynamic of love as evolving mediation between humanity and divinity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The unity of Plato's Symposium is its continuity. The nature and function 
of love unfolds throughout the dialogue in a movement from the implicit 
to the explicit, and from rhetoric to dialectic. Each of the first five 
speeches reveals, in its own way, the nature and function of love in 
rhetorical fonn. What is rhetorically and explicitly revealed, as well as 
that which is dialectically implied, by the first five speeches is grounded 
dialectically by the speech of Socrates. The speeches, taken as a whole, 
express the dynamic of love as evolving mediation between humanity and 
divinity. The continuity among the speeches is often implicit, since 
notions are expanded upon, corrected, pushed aside, and taken up 
again; yet, this unity of their continuity is always present. Nothing is lost 
in the dialectic as each speech makes its contribution toward revealing 
the nature of love. 
The scholars who disagree with this view that the speeches fonn a 
unity in continuity can be grouped into two camps. First, there are those 
who explicitly deny the continuity among the speeches outright, thus 
treating them as separate entities having only an external relation to one 
another. Secondly, there are those who do not explicitly deny an internal 
continuity, yet claim that the thesis that the speeches form a unity is 
both difficult to maintain and fruitless in its application. Edith Hamilton 
2 
is among the former group, proposing that the speeches are merely 
externally related. She writes, 
There is little need for any introduction to [the SynyJOsium) and no 
need for any explanation. It presents no difficulties. It is not an 
argument to be followed, but a series of speeches made at a supper 
party, a symposium. These speeches are not connected with each 
other except that they all have the same subject, love ... 1 
Anyone who reads the Symposium as a serious work of philosophy 
cannot but disagree with the claim that the dialogue •presents no 
difficulties•. I shall, through the course of this work, argue against the 
claim that the speeches are not internally connected. They indeed have 
more in common than their subject. 
Robert Waterfield is among those scholars who propose the latter 
view, claiming that the thesis that the speeches are internally related is a 
difficult view to maintain and is nevertheless fruitless. He says, 
It is common, in considering the purpose of the first five speeches, 
to compare them to the speech of Socrates-Diotima. In what 
respects does Socrates disagree with them? In what respects does 
he develop the points they made? Can they even be seen as 
forming a gradual progression, working toward the theory 
developed in Socrates speech? ... 'lbe main difficulty with these 
kinds of questions is that there are as many points of convergence 
between Socrates' speech and the others as there are points of 
divergence . . . It seems best, then, to take each of the first five 
speeches at face value and to think of what it has to otTer in itself, 
rather than to compare it to what Socrates says. 2 
l Plato, -sympoaium. • Plato; the CnJJcrtmf Pie!nepes Including the J..ettcn. Trans. R. 
Hacldortb. Eda. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. (Princeton, New Jeraey: 
Princeton UPr 1989)r p. 526. 
:r Plato, Symooljym, Robin Waterfield (trans.), (Oxford: OxfOrd UP, 1994), p. Dii -xxili. 
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Waterfield goes on to cite some of the points of apparent contradiction 
among certain speeches. However, in exploring the dialectical continuity 
among the speeches of the Symposium, we are not merely playing a 
'matching game', looking for points of convergence or divergence between 
Socrates and the others. More importantly, the reader observes the 
progression and evolution of the notions raised by each speaker. 'lbe 
similarities among the speeches are not trivial or coincidental. 'lbe 
dialectic is moving and progressing, and thus we can attribute not only 
the points of 'convergence' to this progression, but also the points of 
'divergence'; for progression not only involves a building upon 
fQundations, but it can also involve an alteration of those foundations. 
Waterfield argues that because the speeches do not seem to 
progress successively with absolute consistency, i.e., a certain speech 
might retreat from an advancement that has gone before it, then looking 
for continuity is pointless. He says for example, •tt is particularity hard 
to sustain the thesis that the first five speeches form some kind of 
progression: Aristophanes is certainly more profound than Agathon, and 
yet precedes him ... •3 Although Waterfield is correct that the unity of the 
dialogue is difficult to arrive at, he is incorrect in claiming that the thesis 
is neither correct nor fruitful. Taking the speeches as separate, 
3 Ibid., p. Dill. 
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unconnected entities is to preclude that there is a continuity among 
them. Simply comparing one to another in degrees of profundity or 
morality, is to relate them externally, and to trivialize their mutual 
importance. 'Ibe argument of the dialogue is much more complex than 
Waterfield's view allows. 
Although there are a few occasions when there are retreats from 
earlier advancements, the most important of these, as I see it, occur in 
the speech of Socrates. Although Socrates' speech is the culmination of 
the dialogue, Plato's use of Diotima as the mouthpiece for this 
culmination further complicates the matter. We shall see that Diotima 
herself retreats from several of the achievements of her predecessors. The 
intricate complexity of the dialogue, the difficulty in quantifying its 
progression, and its often implicit continuity, are all the more reason to 
take the speeches as a whole and to explore the continuity among them 
in order to obtain a unified doctrine of love. This view, I believe, is much 
more fruitful in that it takes each speaker seriously toward that end. If 
we believe Hamilton's and Waterfield's view that the speeches do not 
fonn a unity, why should we even bother to read the speeches before that 
of Socrates for any other reason but entertainment? 'lbe speech of 
Socrates is the culmination, yet they would have us believe that it is 
completely independent of the others and that there is nothing to be 
gained by relating it to the others. In fact, that the speeches are related is 
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often explicitly stated in the dialogue, such that some speakers make 
reference to other speakers in their own speeches. Surely Plato could not 
have intended that we throw aside the first third of this dialogue. Love 
itself is, then, a moving dynamic, and true to its ultimate form; this is 
how it is presented within the context of the dialogue as a whole. 4 
I shall explore the unity of the dialogue throughout three chapters. 
The firSt deals with the first five speeches: those of Phaedrus, Pausanias, 
Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon. The chapter is entitled, 'Love 
is Presented', for although these speeches are rhetorical in nature, they 
indeed present the reader with the nature and function of love. Chapter 2 
examines the speech of Socrates and is entitled, 'Love is Grounded'. That 
which is presented in the first five speeches is presented by Socrates in a 
dialectical context, thus grounding the previous rhetorical notions of 
love. Chapter 3 deals with the speech of Alcibiades, which is not a speech 
explicitly about love, but rather, about the nature and conduct of 
4 
'lbere are other scholans wbo hold thia view that the dialogue forma a unity and 
progresaea dialectically from Phaedrus to Alcibiades. Paul Epstein is one such scholar, 
who in hia paper entitled, -rhe Treatment of Poetly in the Symposium of Plato• takes 
thia approach in hia examination of the poaaibilit¥ of the unification of tragedy and 
comedy. 'Ibis approach, as Epstein's paper demonstrates, opens up the Symposium to 
new questions, the answers to which create a greater underatanding of the dialogue as 
a whole. Epstein's focus ia on poetJy, whereas my focus is on the nature and function of 
love and how each speech contributes to the completion of that doctrine. Each speech, 
taken in iaolation, ia but a part of the whole dialogue, and thua in tum, a part of the 
whole doctrine. And while Socrates himself in hia own speech returns to tboee that 
came before him, ao must we return to thoee notions raised by the first fiw: speakers if 
we are to make tbe greatest dialectical advancement poaible from a reading of the 
Symposium in relation to Plato'a ideas concerning love. 
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Socrates. The chapter is entitled, 'Love is Demonstrated'; for in 
Alcibiades' speech we observe, through the conduct of Socrates, both 
how love works, and how the model lover behaves in relation to his/her 
beloved. Because the unity of the Symposium is its continuity, the 
explicit nature of this unity will not be fully present until the end of the 
dialogue. We must move throughout the speeches, establishing the 
groundwork for the fmal revelation of love given to us by Plato at the end 
of the dialogue. 
Throughout the argument of this work, I make much of the 
distinction and relation between rhetoric and dialectic. Socrates, in the 
Phaedrus, discusses this distinction and relation at length. In that 
dialogue, rhetoric is negatively contrasted with dialectic as the art of 
persuasion, or in Socrates' words, •... a kind of influencing of the mind 
by means of words ... • with no regard for the truth. 5 Rhetoric largely 
involves deception, not reason. Dialectic, however, employs reason and 
argument through discussion. Through reason, dialectic can account for 
itself. Both dialectic and rhetoric involve persuasion, but whereas 
rhetoric is subjective, depending on the particular ability of the orator 
rather than on truth, dialectic is objective and true according to reason 
irrespective of its user. First and foremost, dialectic requires definition of 
s Plato, Phlledrus, 26la. 
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the nature of the thing in question. • ... [T)o pursue an inquiry without ... 
[defining the subject) would be like a blind man's progress.116 Thus, 
Socrates claims, one must show •... precisely what is the real and true 
nature of that object on which our discourse . is brought to bear.•7 
Second, the dialectician describes • ... what natural capacity [the thing] 
has to act upon what, and through what means, or by what it can be 
acted upon. •a The function of a thing can be considered only after the 
thing is defined. In short, dialectic defines through reason, the nature 
and function of a thing. 'lbe first five speakers fail to define the object of 
their praise, and thus are often confused about the nature and function 
of love. However, often they hit upon the truth without realizing the 
implicit dialectical achievement of their claims. 'lbey often express the 
truth but can give no account of it. Thus, I shall argue that Diotima's 
speech gives dialectical credit to much of what goes before her. The 
dialectic is immanent in the rhetoric of the first five speeches, yet 
emerges in its completion in the speech of Socrates. I shall say more 
about this as the work progresses. 
Having said this I shall now begin with the speech of Phaedrus. 
6 Ibid., 270e. 
1Jbid. 
a Ibid., 27la. 
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CHAPTER 1 - LOVE IS PRESENTED 
1. 1 THE SPEECH OF PHAEDRUS 
It is fitting that Phaedrus, the •father of the debate", begin the evening of 
conversation with his own speech. 9 This starting point is critically 
important, for it is where the implicit dialectic commences and the 
nature of love begins to unfold. Although we still have very far to go on 
our journey upon reaching the end of Phaedrus' speech since much 
needs to be clarified, expanded, added, and even corrected (for we shall 
see that Phaedrus and the others are incotTect in claiming that Love is a 
•great god•), the dialectical seed is rhetorically planted. 1o Thus, I believe 
that Robert Uoyd Mitchell is cotTect in saying, 
The first shining-forth of Eros will occur in this speech of the 
Shining One. Nothing of what follows will be able to do any more 
than reflect this light in various ways. All else that will eventually 
come to be seen of Eros will already be contained implicitly in this 
speech.ll 
9 Plato, Symposium, 177d. 
10 Ibid., 178a. 
tl Robert ~ Mitchell, The Hymn to Erps: A Rpding of Plato's SYmposium, (Lanham: 
University Preas of America, 1993), p. 19. Mitchell points out, -ais name, ~. is 
baaed on the word fPGDS' or tpq, light. It means bright, gleaming, shining. Phaedrus is 
the Shining one•. (p. 19) Martha Nuaabaum says that the name 'Phaedrus' means 
'sparkling'. Martha Nu1!18baum, 1be Fmpi'ity of Goodne•: Luck apd Ethics in Gn;ek 
Tn!pdv and Philosophy (C&mbrid&e: Cambridge UP, 1986), p. 200. 
9 
Initially, this might seem like too great a claim to make for 
Phaednls' comparatively short, and awkwardly flowing speech, yet the 
nature and properties of Eros are indeed contained implicitly in his 
words. However, I prefer to extend this claim to all of the speeches before 
that of Socrates as their cumulative achievement. What is presented 
implicitly and rhetorically by Phaedrus is brought explicitly to light 
through dialectic/rhetoric in the account of Socrates and Diotima. I 
shall now bring out these elements in Phaedrus' speech, for they are the 
groundwork for our establishment of a continuity among all of the 
speeches of the Symposium. We shall build on these ideas as we go 
through the dialogue, thereby moving toward a definition of love that is 
coherent and complete.12 
12 Before we begin to examine the speech of Phaedrus and thoee that follow it, it is 
necessary to explain the traditional roles of lover and beloved as they were followed in 
Athenian aocie~ during Plato's time. Waterfield writes, IIJn ancient Athens, 
homoeroticism was considered perfectly natural, espeda1Jy in the leisun!d claaees. I uae 
the leiS fami1iar term 'homoeroticism• becauae not many Athenians were actually 
homosexual in the aenee of being inclined to love only members of their own aex ... 
More commonly, the same people were sexually inclined towards members of both sexes 
... TypicaBy, the objects of male homoerotic clesiJes were young boys in their teens. [The 
older Iewers) would each pursue [the younaer beloved) , and try to consummate a aexual 
a88ir .. . the laver would achieve the enjoyment at least of conquest and of sexual 
releue, whBe the boy might at the most reciprocate with philia (loyal aft'ection or 
friendsbipJ, which would be due for the lover's patrona&e (for future political 
advancement, perhaps», rather than for his sexual attentions.• (Waterfield, pp. xv-xvi). 
1bis relation is preaent in each speech of the Symposium. It will, hcnuewlr, undergo a 
great transf'ormatian from the common aocial norm, of which Waterfield informs us, to a 
dialectical umon of minds, as we shaJl obeerve. See alao, ~r. K. J .. -&os and Nomos 
{Plato Symposium 182a-185c)y• Bullefift oftM Institute ofcmsii:Gl Studies 11 (1964) 31-
42. 
10 
Much of what Phaedrus contributes to the nature of love is 
contained rhetorically in his four examples of it. 13 In Phaedrus' speech 
we do not have an explicit discourse on the nature of love, but rather, 
through his use of examples we see love in action. Much of the 
scholarship, however, fmds fault with all four of the examples of love that 
Phaedrus provides, in relation to what scholars mistakenly take to be his 
purpose in speaking, as we shall see. We shall examine the scholarship 
on this matter in some depth as it relates specifically to what I believe is 
Phaedrus' contribution to the moving dialectic. Furthermore, Phaedrus' 
first example, that of the anny composed entirely of lovers and their 
beloveds is the most dialectically rich, and thus I shall save this 
particular example for last. The example of the army of lovers and 
beloveds is set apart from the other three in its adherence to the 
traditional lover /beloved relationship, which three Louis Ruprecht claims 
contradict this traditional relation, the roles being switched concerning 
Achilles and Patroclus, and the others involving •... heterosexual and 
marital relationships ... • 14 Mitchell, whom I have quoted above, 
13 Plato, Symposium, 178e-180b. 1beae examples are: (1) 1be army compoaed entirely of 
lovers and beloveds, (2) Alcestis, who wi1lin8lY took her husband Admetus' place in 
death, (3) Orpheus, who braved the depths of Hades to rescue Eurydice, and (4) 
Achillea, who avenged his lover Patroclus" death, knowing that if be did ao, he too would 
surely die. Although the reader might find it useful to read Edith Hamilton or Robert 
Graws on the detaiJa of theee last three myths, the light in which Phaednla calla fOrth 
these examples is important in the context of the dialogue fOr the establishment of the 
aelfleaanesa of love, aa we shaD see. 
14 Louis A.. Ruprecht. Sympo'ip· Platp. the Erptic. and Moral Value (Albany, New York: 
State University of New York Preas, 1999), p. 54. 
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summarizes his discontent with the examples of Alcestis and Orpheus: 
•First, a male (unnamed) who, in the face of death, has to hide behind 
his wife's skirts; now, a male who refuses to allow death to keep what 
belongs to it ... •15 The scholarship in general seems to attack Phaedrus' 
choice of examples, pointing to the fact that they do not adhere to the 
traditional lover /beloved relationship. Although such claims, supposedly 
demonstrating Phaedrus' inability to provide a coherent argument, might 
be justified if Phaedrus' goal is to praise the homosexual lover/beloved 
relationship, this is not his explicit intent. Mitchell, Ruprecht, and 
Stanley Rosen too, as we shall see, mistakenly take the praise of this 
relationship as Phaedrus' thesis and then proceed to criticize these 
examples which fail to 'back up' this relationship. And while Ruprecht is 
correct to point out that Phaedrus' speech implies that • ... there is 
something wrong with the crude categories of lover and beloved ... •, he is 
mistaken in saying that Phaedrus' • ... argument collapses finally under 
its own dead weighe-; for his main intent is not to praise that particular 
relationship.16 Mitchell is hung up on the fact that Admetus is left 
unnamed; yet I believe this shows that Phaedrus is not concerned with 
Admetus, but rather, his focus is on the actions of Alcestis. 17 The 
15 Mitchell, p. 24. 
16 Ruprecht, p. 54. 
17 Mitchell, p. 24. 
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reader's focus in these examples should be on what Phaedrus himself 
emphasizes and in fact does say, not on what he does not say. 
The closest we get to an expHcit statement of Phaeclrus' intent or 
purpose in speaking is given to us by Eryximachus' introduction to the 
speeches. Eryximachus relates to us that Phaedrus' complaint is that • ... 
the god of Love, so ancient and so great, has had no song of praise 
composed for him by a single one of all the many poets that have ever 
been. • 18 Thus, we might say that it is Phaedrus' intent to praise love 
itself, not its particular instantiation in the lover /beloved relationship. 19 
Therefore, one should look to what Phaedrus actually brings out through 
his choice of examples, and how these examples contribute to the 
understanding of the nature of love developing within the dialogue as a 
whole; for it is in these examples that Phaedrus' contribution to the 
understanding of the nature of love can be discovered. 
In one sense, the examples that Phaedrus provides, while stepping 
out of the bounds of the traditional lover /beloved relationship, succeed 
by this very fact. Although Phaedrus seems to provide these examples of 
love in order to strengthen his claim that •... if we could somewise 
contrive to have a city or an army composed of lovers and favourites ... 
18 Plato, Symposium, 177b. 
19 Eryximachua prop:»aea to bia companions, • ... my opinion is that we ought each of ua 
to make a speech in tum, from left to right, praising Love aa beautifully aa he can ... • 
Plato, Symposium, 177d. 
13 
one might almost consider [love to be] able to make even a little band 
victorious over all the world•, they show what love can move one to do 
beyond the traditional roles of lover and beloved. 20 William Cobb writes, 
The status of women in this context is an issue that appears 
several times in the dialogue, though what Plato intends by it is 
unclear. The possibility that he means to challenge the dominant 
male chauvinism of his day is highly debatable.21 
Although it is not clear what Plato's intentions are, certainly Phaedrus, 
as he is presented here at least, is not concerned with age, sex, or sexual 
preference in matters of love. As we go through the speeches in the 
Symposium we will see a tension arise within the relationship between 
lover and beloved, a relationship which was socially accepted in Athens 
at the time during which Plato was writing. 
What Phaedrus is rhetorically showing by these examples is the 
way in which love can move one to make the ultimate sacrifice. Both 
Achilles and Alcestis lmow that they will die, yet they go through with 
their actions despite this and for the sake of those whom they love. This 
is a crucial point, for the notion of self-sacrifice is all but absent in the 
later speeches, and surprisingly so in that of Diotima. This is Phaedrus' 
own contribution which is neither supplied nor defeated by Diotima's 
~ Ibid., 179a. 
:n WiJJjam, Cobb, (trans) The SVmposjum and fhacdrus. Plato's Erotjc Dialol\lea: 
Translated with Jntrpd.uctign and fgmmmtaricfl~ ~bany. New York: State Uniftnity of 
New York Press. 1993). p. 64. 
14 
arguments. The way in which this notion of self-sacrifice is presented 
intrinsically links self-sacrifice with death, for death seems to be the 
ultimate expression of it. (It is interesting that Diotima will later link love 
with a fear of death and a subsequent desire for immortality rather than 
with what is here depicted as an acceptance of it for the sake of the 
beloved, regardless of one's traditional role concerning age and sex.) 
Ruprecht claims that Phaedrus' •main point" is the linking of love and 
death. 22 'Ibis will be a central claim of Diotima, demonstrated 
dialectically in Socrates' account of their conversation. Thus, this 
connection, and indeed tension between love and death is an important 
contribution to the moving dialectic and will be taken up at many points 
later in the dialogue. What precisely is going on in Phaedrus' examples is 
that love elevates one to virtuous action, and in Phaedrus' speech, the 
virtue is courage. This is made explicit in the first and richest example 
that he provides: that of the army composed of lovers and their beloveds. 
Phaedrus says, •... Love kindles the same flame or valor in the 
faintest heart that bums in those whose courage is innate, • thus moving 
the lover to act courageously.23 Already at this early stage of the 
dialogue, love acts as a mediator between virtue and vice; love elevates 
the lover to act courageously, thus making his/her action equal to that of 
22 RulftCht, p. 54. 
33 PlatO, Syrrapoaium, 179b. 
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the innately courageous person. This is not the same, however, as acting 
courageously out of a knowledge of courage; for the lover does not have 
knowledge of what is and is not to be feared; but rather, he has true 
opinion of courage.24 Exactly what Love's relation to true opinion is, is 
not made explicit until the speech of Socrates. What we have at this 
initial stage, however, is a rhetorical description of what love does. Love 
incites one to virtuous action, and thus, the physical act of the lover and 
the courageous person is the same: he/she (he in this particular 
example) 'courageously' protects his/her beloved, risking his/her own life 
for the other's sake. 
Rosen says, interpreting these words of Phaedrus, that love acts as 
a kind of substitute for virtue. 25 In a sense he is correct, for the lover 
neither achieves nor embodies the virtue of courage, yet he should not be 
viewed negatively as Rosen views him, for the matter is much more 
complicated. Rosen interprets Phaedrus as meaning that the lover-
soldiers are shamed into acting properly, much as Alcibiades will admit 
that Socrates shames him. To an extent, Rosen is again correct, for 
Phaedrus does say, • ... the lover would rather anyone than his beloved 
should see him leave the ranks or throw away his arms in flight - nay, he 
24 For a sustained look at Plato's treatment or COUJ'II&e, see the Lat:lws and Protagoras. 
:15 Stanley Roeen, Plato's Symposium (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1968): -m his 
substitution or Eros for virtue, Phaedrus tacitly appeals to the premiae that Eros will 
gain more of virtue's benefits for more people than virtue would itaelf.lt (p. 54t. 
16 
would sooner die a thousand deaths.•26 Rosen, however, moves from here 
to claim mistakenly that, for Phaedrus, the lover acts out of his own 
selfish desires. He writes, •Eros, then, is for Phaedrus a substitute for 
virtue, and especially for courage. It enables inferior men to perfonn 
'great and splendid deeds. •27 This, I believe, is an improper reading of 
what Phaedrus actually says: 
... the very presence of Love kindles the same flame of valour in the 
faintest heart that bums in those whose courage is innate. 28 
Love is not a substitute for virtue, but rather, it brings about or acts as a 
catalyst for virtuous action. Certainly the cause of the courageous act 
differs between the innately courageous man and the lover (the fonner 
acting from knowledge of courage while the latter acts according to true 
opinion), yet one need not assume then that the motivation of the lover is 
selfish desire. In fact, Phaedrus' illustrations subsequent to this example, 
i.e., the three we have mentioned above, clearly indicate the opposite: the 
lover and beloved in these examples sacrifice themselves. (Again, note the 
tension between these categories, for the majority of Phaedrus' examples 
do not fit the traditional lover /beloved relationship). 
26 Plato, Symposium, 179b. 
71 Roeen, p. 53. 
::til Plato, Syrraposi&un, 179a-b. Although this translation is a little -&wery", it cloea well 
to encompass the meaning of the Greek which reads, ·~ OJWIOV £I1IGI w aprDUiJ tp~, 
i.e., •ao that he ia the same as/like/equal to the moat c:ourageoua peraon with respect 
to bia natum. • 
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Phaedrus' presentation of love shows it to be somewhere in 
between courage and cowardice. The lover performs the courageous act, 
but not out of an understanding of the nature of courage. Love, however, 
seems to provide true opinion of courage, whereby the lover performs the 
same action as does the courageous person. One might ask then, if the 
act itself is the same in the case of the lover and the courageous person, 
then what is left to distinguish between the two, and more than that, 
how can we judge one to be greater than the other, as Rosen mistakenly 
does? In the Meno, Socrates argues that true opinion and lmowledge 
produce the same result in practice. He uses the example of two guides: 
one who knows the way to Larissa and has traveled the road before, and 
another, who while not lmowing for certain how to get to Larissa, having 
never been there, judges correctly the way to get there. Socrates 
concludes of the latter man, 
. . . [A]s long as he has correct opinion on the points about which 
the other has lmowledge, he will be just as good a guide, believing 
the truth but not lmowing it ... Therefore true opinion is as good a 
guide as lmowledge for the purpose of acting rightly. That is what 
we left out just now in our discussion of the nature of virtue, when 
we said that knowledge is the only guide to right action. There was 
al "t tru . . 29 so, 1 seems, e opuuon. 
~ Plato, Meno, 97b-c. An examination of the nature of true opinion is esaential in 
distUaeion of the ~ for as we abaU aee, Diotima likens the natwe of love to 
the natwe of true opinion, for both are between two poles. 
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Thus, love, which provides true opinion, is highly valuable as a guide for 
•right action•; any attempt to degrade love's value in light of this passage 
certainly cannot be condoned. 
Certainly Rosen is correct to say that love is not a virtue (Diotima 
will be explicit about this), yet this is not grounds for looking at love in a 
negative way- Diotima herself warns us against this way of thinking: 
. . . do you imagine that whatever is not beautiful must needs be 
ugly? ... And what is not skilled ignorant? Have you not observed 
that there is something halfway between skill and ignorance?JO 
As I have argued, Rosen mistakenly interprets Phaedrus to be saying 
that because the lover is not courageous from a knowledge of courage, he 
performs the same act that the courageous man would perform only out 
of his own selfish desires and his shame at being seen to be a coward. 
Rosen claims further that the love of the lover is based on selfishness. He 
writes, 
. . . Phaedrus comes close to telling us that the lover is not really 
manly or courageous, but is made to resemble the best man by his 
passion, no matter how base he may be ... It is entirely compatible 
with Phaeclrus' position to argue that the vulgar acts of vulgar 
men, so long as they look like the heroic acts of heroes, are equal 
to them in excellence.3t 
30 Plato, Symposium. 202a. 
31 Roeen, p. 53. 
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What Rosen says here is completely contrary to Phaedrus' position. In 
fact, nothing could be less compatible with Phaedrus' position than this 
view in light of his examples. In the conclusion of his discussion of 
Phaedrus' speech, Rosen summarizes it as such: • All men are selfish, but 
the most effective form of selfishness is to make use of the desires of 
others. •32 If there is anything we can apply from Diotima· to this line of 
reasoning it is this: • ... do not compel what is not beautiful to be ugly ... 
or what is not good to be bad. •33 Rosen says that initially •... Eros 
emerges clearly from Phaeclrus' speech as selflessness, the anti-passion 
of the lover which corresponds to the anti-passionate selfishness of the 
beloved. • But he claims that Phaedrus •... denies the selflessness of 
Alcestis by having the gods give her a present of resurrection•, as though 
Alcestis lalew somehow that she would get this reward. • 34 In Phaedrus' 
portrayal of Alcestis, this knowledge is certainly not evident. 35 Rosen 
takes Phaedrus' examples of Alcestis and Achilles as instances of 
•nobility for the sake of a reward•. 36 
Daniel Anderson makes this same mistake: 
(Phaedrus1 ... discussion of that army, ironically, reduces courage 
to the fear of shame, thus debasing the virtue he is trying to 
praise. There is for him no such thing as courage, but the 
3~ Ibid., p. 54. 
33 Plato, Syrraposium, 202b. 
34 Roaen, p. 55. 
35 Plato, Symposium, 179b-c. 
36 Roaen, p. 57. 
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appearance of courage can be achieved because some fears are 
greater than others. 37 
This apparently common misreading of Phaedrus leads much of the 
scholarship to make further incorrect claims about what Phaedrus says 
of love, shame, and honour. In particular, it cuts off Phaedrus from a 
continuity that actually exists between him and Diotima. (Rosen sees a 
continuity among the first three speakers only in tenns of the selfishness 
of love. )38 The unity of the dialogue is the continuity among the seven 
speeches. Although the common notions raised by the speakers, i.e., love 
as an intermediary, love as the dynamic through which the virtues are 
realized, etc., are treated differently by each speaker, none of them 
explicitly contradict each other, aside from Socrates' argument that love 
is not a god. In each speech, contrary to what some of the scholarship 
believes, love is a positive thing, i.e., love is good. Furthermore, the main 
notion of continuity among the speeches is that love leads one toward the 
good. All of the speeches aftinn this in some way. 
When we come to Socrates' speech, wherein love is dialectically 
shown to be desire, we might find ourselves asking: What is wrong with 
37 Daniel E. Anderaon, The Me"m of pjonDOB: A Comrpmtary on Plato'• SymPosium 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Presa, 1993), pp. 23-4. Not only does 
Andenon make the mistake or interpreting Phaedrus' speech aa deacribing love aa 
being fOunded on selfishness and shame, but furthermore he uxwes &om this mistake 
to say that for Pbaedrus there is • ••• no such thing aa CCJ111'88Ie ••• • 'Ibis is yet another 
example of one running wild with falee il*rences baaed on ungrounded interpretations, 
a trend which woem• to be all too common in the acboJarahip on this matter. 
31 RolleD, p. 65. 
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desire anyway? Love turns out dialectically to be desire. Desire need not 
be selfish. Rosen and Anderson jump to the conclusion that the lover's 
desire on the battlefield is for the continuance of bodily pleasure 
afterwards. Thus, Rosen claims, •Pbaedrus debases the Homeric heroes 
by identifying their might with a slavish subjection to the beloved.•39 We 
do not get an explicit examination of the object of desire until the speech 
of Pausanias. Pausanias makes explicit what the desire should be for: 
that which is eternal and unchanging, i.e., the soul and virtue. The lover 
acts courageously from this desire, not from a bodily desire. Phaedrus' 
examples clearly illustrate the opposite of the position Rosen and 
Anderson place in Phaedrus' mouth, i.e., that love for Phaedrus is based 
upon selfish desires. Both Alcestis' and Achilles' willingness to die to save 
and avenge, respectively, their lovers does not stem from bodily desires: 
how could the prospect of bodily pleasure possibly be the motivation for 
such action when they lmow they will be dead? One must read into 
Phaedrus' speech something other than what he in fact says in order to 
contradict what I believe is clearly Phaedrus' true position. 40 
I believe that Cobb is correct when he writes of Phaedrus' speech, 
•Love is seen as entirely positive in its effect, inspiring virtue in those 
39 Roeen. p. 53. 
40 Reading PbaedJUa• examples in the ligbt and context in which be bimaelf presents 
tbem cannot, I believe, lead one to conclude other than that love involves eelfleea action. 
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who have it.••n As I hope to have shown, Phaedrus' contribution to the 
moving dialectic on the most basic level, if we pay attention to what he 
actually says rather than to the mistakes which the scholarship 
perpetrates, is precisely that love involves virtuous self sacrifice as shown 
rhetorically through his examples. The examples show that this love need 
not be restricted to the traditional lover /beloved relationship, but 
extends to heterosexual relationships, i.e., is universal; and further, the 
virtuous act can be performed by the woman as well as the man, and by 
the younger as well as the older. In this sense, Phaedrus begins the 
universalization of love, the next great step of which, as we shall see, is 
taken by Eryximachus. On a more complex level, in Phaedrus' speech 
love is intrinsically related to conduct, and as an intermediary between 
virtue and vice, it is capable of elevating one to virtuous action. Love is a 
moving dynamic, a kind of kinetic intermediation. Related to this point, 
the dialectical seed is planted for this universal truth that will later 
become explicit: love is not a virtue, but rather, the dynamic through 
which the virtues are realized. Furthermore, this mediator is necessary if 
one is ever going to be able to attain the good. Phaedrus, coming the 
closest he does to a definition of love, says that Love • ... is the ancient 
source of all our highest good ... [It is] that contempt for the vile, and 
41 Cobb, p. 64. 
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emulation of the good, without which neither cities nor citizens are 
capable of any great or noble work . ..,.2 It is the function of love to elevate 
the lower to the higher. Love can elevate those with even the basest 
desires to perfonn courageous acts, yet their desires need not be 
assumed to be base. Yet even the basest desires implicitly express the 
absolute desire for the good, which is love itself. 'lbus, love, even at this 
early stage stands in an essential relation to the good. As early as 
Phaedrus, love is an intennediary, elevating the base to the virtuous - a 
principle of motion, here implicitly related to true opinion. Conduct is 
always an element of love right from the beginning, particularly in its 
characterization as good or bad. The movement of the dialectic certainly 
has begun with a tremendously rich start in this first speech. Yet without 
this implicit light present within, we could not arrive at the splendid 
vision yet to come. 
•l Plato, Symposium, 178c-d. 
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1. 2 THE SPEECH OF PAUSANIAS 
We should be aware from the start that Pausanias' speech will 
break new ground, for we are told that it is remembered whereas the 
speeches between it and that of Phaedrus are forgotten. 43 Pausanias 
makes explicit the question of the nature of the object of love. He 
introduces what the proper object of love is and indicates, yet falters on 
what the proper conduct between lover and beloved should be. Although 
the proper conduct between lover and beloved is concretized later in the 
dialogue through the speech of Alcibiades, which describes how Socrates, 
the perfect model of the lover, behaves toward his beloved, it is 
Pausanias who first raises the question. It is certainly true, as Cobb 
notes, that -The behaviour of Socrates as reported by Alcibiades seems to 
stand in marked contrast to Pausanias' view ... •44 In short, Pausanias 
presents the role of the lover as the responsibility to teach virtue to his 
beloved, who in tum provides the lover with sexual gratification. Socrates 
however, while he teaches virtue to his beloved Alcibiades, denies 
Alcibiades' physical advances. We shall examine this in detail in Chapter 
3. Cobb also points out two prevailing interpretations of Pausanias' 
speech in the scholarship. He writes, 
43 •(Phaedrua' speech) was followed by several others, which my friend could not 
recollect at all clearly; ao be pasaed them over and related that of Pausaniaa ... • (Ibid., 
180c). 
44 Cobb, p. 65. 
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It is tempting to assume that he [Pausanias) is articulating a 
defense and explanation of actual practice in Athens, or at least, 
providing an idealized view of practice among the elite. On the 
other hand, the speech may also be read as an example of self-
serving cleverness on the part of a man who enjoys this kind of 
relationship. 45 
Again, I believe Rosen, in his overly complex fabrication of Pa.usanias' 
intentions, falls into the latter category, missing the main contribution of 
this speech. Rosen writes, •Pausanias .. . is seriously concerned with 
neither logic nor morality. He is engaged in an intricate and sophistic 
attempt to secure his own advantage.~ Alan Bloom also believes that 
Pa.usanias has a hidden agenda, seeing his speech as an attempt to 
defend his own lifestyle. Pederasty, he says, • ... needs a kind of 
justification, and Pa.usanias, who turns out to be a rather timid fellow, 
wants the protection of nomos for his practice. lf47 It is, however, these 
positions that need justification. Who knows exactly what Pausanias' 
sexual practices entail? Certainly they are not explicitly clear in the 
dialogue. 48 Such attempts to characterize Pausanias as desperately 
defending his own lifestyle involve a lot of •reading into• his actual words, 
45Jbid. 
46 Roaen, p. 63. 
47 Alan Bloom, Loye and Friendship (New York: Simon and Schuster. 1993), p. 459. 
48 In deimae of Roaen and Bloom, one might point to a reference AriatopbaDea rnekra 
later in the dialogue, augeating a homoeexual relationship between Pauuni•• and 
Agathon at 193b-c. He says, referring to tboee who mund their other bahea, •And let 
not Eryximachua retort on my speech with a comic mock, and say I refer to Pauaani•a 
and Aga.thon. • This reference is not enough to cbaracterble Pa.uaaniaa' intent in 
speaking in such a negative, dei:naive, and eeif-aening way. 
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and reflect the bias of these scholars. Such attempts, I believe, are 
neither adequately grounded nor helpful. However, Bloom is correct in 
saying that •Pausanias is going to get himself into one little problem . . . : 
if souls are the concern, what is so important about this bodily desire 
and its satisfaction~ We must remember that this is a moving 
dialectic, and later in the dialogue Alcibiades' description of Socrates' 
conduct will contradict what Pausanias says here in relation to the 
conduct of the lover in that the physical act drops out of the picture 
altogether. Pausanias, however, does make an important contribution to 
the dialogue as a whole, rhetorically introducing notions that will later be 
investigated and established dialectically. 
Pausanias, as does Phaedrus, presupposes the definition of love, 
but distinguishes between the one and the many. He claims that there 
are two kinds of love: one which moves one to act virtuously, and 
another which moves one to act viciously. Love is split in two and will 
later be brought back together by Eryximachus. Love, which is implicitly 
desire here, is neither good nor bad in itself. Rather, it is how one acts 
upon his/her desire, according to Pausanias, that renders an act 
virtUous or vicious. Pausanias says that •... Love is not of himself either 
admirable or noble, but only when he moves us to love nobly.•50 
49 Ibid .• p. 461. 
50 Plato, Symposium, 181. 
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However, Pausanias' division of love is problematic. Initially, he says that 
there are two distinct loves: the heavenly, noble Aphrodite and the 
earthly, base Aphrodite. Yet here he seems to speak of one love which, as 
desire, has the power to move one to act in two different ways. As I have 
said, Eryximachus will do more rhetorically to clear up this tension. 
Either way, love is again presented here, as it was by Phaedrus, as 
a principle of motion, neither good nor bad in itself, yet moving in a realm 
between the two poles. Love is explicitly and more complexly related to 
conduct in this speech, again appearing as an instigator or catalyst for 
action. Love itself, considered apart from the conduct inspired by it, is 
worthy of neither admiration nor disdain. It can, however, move one to 
either good or bad actions. Thus, where in the speech of Phaedrus 
love\ desire moves the soldier to act courageously or virtuously, in 
Pausanias' speech, we have the suggestion that desire can also move one 
to act viciously. In both speeches, however (and throughout the rest of 
the dialogue for that matter), love is intrinsically related to conduct. It is 
also interesting to note that if love itself is neither admirable nor noble, 
as Pausanias says, then in itself, it is not necessarily worthy of praise. 
This prefigures Socrates' dialectical position that love is not a great god. 
The figure of love as a god worthy of praise loses hold as we move 
through Phaedrus to Aristophanes, and is dialectically destroyed by 
Socrates. 
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As we have seen, according to Pausanias love itself (which is 
implicitly desire here} is neither good nor bad. Rather, it is how the love 
is manifested or the way in which it is expressed that renders it worthy of 
either praise or blame. This claim gains dialectical ground when love is 
shown to be desire. It is not clear at this point whether the two lovers' 
actions are the same or not. Initially, it seems that the sexual act of the 
Uranian and Pandemic lovers is the same, yet that of the former is 
admirable, for he has the soul in mind, and that of the latter is culpable, 
for he is concerned only with the body. Pausanias says, 
Now the vicious lover is the follower of the earthly Love who desires 
the body rather than the soul; his heart is set on what is mutable 
and must therefore be inconstant ... whereas the lover whose heart 
is touched by moral beauties is constant all his life, for he has 
become one with what will never fade.st 
If the act of each lover is the same, how is the manner in which it 
is perfonned altered in the case of the Uranian lover to make the act 
good, and in the case of the Pandemic lover evil? Is it anything more than 
what the lover has in mind, i.e., the body or the soul, or intends for the 
relationship, i.e., for it to last temporarily or to survive? It seems as 
though the duration of the love depends upon the duration of the object. 
If the object of love wanes or degenerates, so too will the love of this 
Sl Ibid., 183e. 
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object; an eternal love, according to Pausanias, requires an eternal 
object. Pausanias continues, 
To do the thing basely is to gratify a wicked man in a wicked 
manner: 'nobly' means having to do with a good man in a good 
manner.52 
Notice how Pausanias defines the terms 'base' and 'noble' in terms of the 
conduct of the beloved. Pausanias' great achievement in his speech, i.e., 
the explicit emergence of the importance of proper conduct in relation to 
the proper object of desire, is explicitly connected more with the beloved 
who gratifies (yet it also applies to the lover as we shall see). He then 
proceeds to describe the conduct of the two lovers. 
By 'wicked' we mean that popular lover, who craves the body 
rather than the soul: as he is not in love with what abides, he 
himself is not abiding. As soon as the bloom of the body he so 
loved begins to fade he 'flutters off and is gone,' . . . whereas the 
lover of a nature that is worthy abides throughout life, as being 
fused into one with the abiding. 53 
It seems as though for Pausanias, the base act is physically 
indistinguishable from the virtuous act (as are the act of the lover and 
that of the innately courageous man in Phaedrus' speech, although 
there, neither is base), and thus implementing the law he proposes would 
!J1 Ibid., 183d-e. 
53 Ibid.. 183e-184a. 
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be difficult if not impossible until after the fact. (Pausanias himself seems 
to reaUR this complication.)54 Yet, Pausanias insists on a distinction 
between the •manner" in which the act is performed in each case. What 
exactly is this manner, and does the higher love have a physical element? 
Pausanias is not clear about this. This distinction, implicitly 
present in Pausanias, is not made explicit until the speech of Alcibiades, 
where indeed the sexual act is different in that there is a mingling of 
minds/souls between Uranian lover and beloved rather than a mingling 
of bodies as between Pandemic lover and beloved. Pausanias takes us to 
the summit rhetorically in that the proper relationship between lover and 
beloved is based on and remains within that which is eternal, i.e., the 
soul; yet in effect, he places this knowledge in the mind of the beloved 
only. He says, 
... if in any meeting between a lover and his beloved each has his 
set of guidelines - the lover appreciating that any service he 
performs for a beloved who gratifies him would be morally 
acceptable, and the boy appreciating that any favours he does for a 
man who is teaching him things and making him good would be 
morally acceptable ... 55 
Pausanias places the wicked lover who •. .. desires the body rather than 
the soul ... • in contrast to the Uranian or noble lover who, accordingly, 
54 See Ibid., 185a-b. The beloved is admired in his willingness to take a chance on any 
lover whom he believes might make him morally better. It aeema that there is no way to 
tell for sure which lovers can make tbe beloved better bei>re a relationship is started, 
and thus the beloved can ofbm be mistaken. 
55 Ibid.' 184cl. 
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loves the soul of the beloved. 56 However, in his failure to let go of the 
physical act, Pausanias takes this lm.owledge away from the lover, 
making him out to be inferior to his beloved. For in the relation described 
above, the beloved desires the wisdom of the lover, yet the lover desires 
the body of the beloved. If the lover possesses this lm.owledge concerning 
the value of the soul, why is he •enslaved•, as Pausanias says, to the 
body? It is the beloved who has a love of that which lasts, a love which 
moves him to seek out a teacher of virtue, not the lover. The lover 
becomes the wicked man described above, i.e., he who • ... craves the 
body and not the soul ... • as an end. 57 The love of the lover in Pa.usanias' 
speech is not purified: he desires the mutable body of the beloved and 
therefore, his love is not stable. According to Pa.usanias' own argument 
concerning the nature of the proper object of love, he should conclude 
that there is no physical exchange between lover and beloved. 1bere is a 
higher implicit dialectic progressing here in which Pausanias 
participates. 
Pausanias is confused about the notion of proper conduct because 
he does not understand fully what he has begun to grasp. The dialectic is 
moving, however, and we again see the problem with these traditional 
roles of lover and beloved. Pausanias' distinction between the proper and 
56 Ibid.. 183e. 
57 Ibid.. 183e. 
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improper objects of love raises the question: what does the lover achieve 
in the exchange? Now that we have some idea of the kind of thing that is 
worthy of love, i.e., the eternal soul (the object of desire has yet to be 
universalized as the eternal good), the lover seems to get the 'raw end of 
the deal' in the exchange, i.e., he receives mere sexual gratification in 
exchange for his salvific wisdom. Later in the dialogue Socrates will 
explicitly point out this imbalance in Pausanias' (and perhaps the 
socially accepted Athenian's) view of this relationship when he tells 
Alcibiades 
... if you're trying to barter your own beauty for the beauty you 
have found in me, you're driving a very hard bargain. You're trying 
to exchange the semblance of beauty for the thing itself - like 
Diomede and Glaucus swapping bronze for gold. 58 
This again, however, contrary to what Rosen will tell us, suggests that 
the lover is not selfish at all. He indeed gives his gold for bronze, and in 
Socrates' case, he gives his gold, i.e., his grasp of virtue, for nothing. In 
this relationship, the lover, as a personification of love, raises up his 
beloved. 'lbe claim that love is more akin to the lover than the beloved is 
not explicitly raised until the speech of Socrates, wherein it is 
dialectically grounded. 
58 Ibid., 218e. 
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At this point in the dialectic we can observe what is happening to 
the traditional lover /beloved relationship. Phaedrus' speech indicates 
that there is something wrong with these categories, as Ruprecht notes. 59 
The ultimate sacrifice, which only love can motivate, is made by both 
men and women. The love relationship is ideally between lover and lover, 
as we shall see in the absolute self-reflection in Aristophanes, and not 
necessarily between lover and beloved. In the speech of Pausanias, the 
lover takes on the role of a teacher, providing training in virtue. The 
sexual act becomes problematic as we have seen, thus setting the stage 
for Alcibiades' speech wherein Socrates' love for Alcibiades takes on a 
new meaning: there is no physical exchange. However, there is a 
psychical exchange which produces ideal offspring as we shall see. 
In summary, Pausanias tells us what the proper object of love is. If 
love is to last, its object must also be something that lasts. Tile proper 
object of love, demonstrated rhetorically at this point, is the eternal soul. 
Furthennore, proper conduct (or the higher fonn of conduct since there 
is no purification of the body in Plato) between lovers consists of a 
mingling of minds rather than bodies, and in this sense, Pausanias 
anticipates Diotima. Pausanias sees this but fails to let go of the physical 
act of the lover, as I have said, making him to be the lesser of the two. In 
S9 • •• • there is aometbing wrong with the aude categories of lover and beloved. • 
Ruprecht, p. 55. 
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Plato there is no explicit doctrine or the purification or the body; thus, as 
we shall see in Socrates' behaviour, the body is left behind or, in a sense, 
detached. Furthermore, the lover /beloved relationship takes on a new 
form, i.e., that or teacher/student. Also, we remember that love for 
Pausanias has somehow split in two, thus creating a dialectical tension 
between the one and the many, a tension that will be taken up by 
Eryximachus. Keeping this progression in mind, we now tum to his 
speech. 
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1. 3 THE SPEECH OF ERYXIMACHUS 
Eryximachus introduces the notion of love as a cosmic principle of 
unity. He does not deal so much with the nature of the object of love as 
he does with the nature of love itself and what it does. In this sense the 
speech of Eryximachus has more in common with that of Phaedrus, 
rather than with that of Pausanias. However, Eryximachus himself 
claims a continuity with Pausanias' speech in that he will • ... append a 
conclusion ... • to Pausanias' speech, which he • ... did not properly finish 
••• -60 Pausanias has raised some important points which Eryximachus 
treats as premises to the conclusion that is his own speech. 
Eryximachus elevates the discussion beyond the love between people to 
love between things (which might initially seem strange), thus rendering 
the principle of love to be a universal principle. Paul Epstein writes, 
... by making eros a cosmic as well as human principle, the speech 
raises the discussion beyond the pedestrian level assumed by 
those speakers who limit themselves to the current Athenian social 
order.61 
Although Phaedrus has already in his own way surpassed this social 
order through his choice of examples, love, as a force of attraction or 
60 Plato, Symposium, 186a. 
61 Paul Epstein, -rhe Treatment ofPoetly in tbe Symposium of Plato•, Apirpyt 4 (1999) 
(http:/fwww.mun.ca/animuafl999vol4/epatein4.htm), paragraph 16. 
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unity, had yet to move beyond human affairs. However, Eryximachus 
says, 
... besides attracting the souls of men to human beauty, Love has 
many other objects and many other subjects, and .. . his influence 
may be traced ... in every form of existence - so great, so 
wonderful, and so all-embracing is the power of Love in every 
activity, whether sacred of profane. 62 
Although for Eeyximachus Love is explicitly still a god, he describes 
its action as a force or impulse that attracts.63 He says, • ... Love is not 
merely an impulse of human souls towards beautiful men but the 
attraction of all creatures to a great variety of things ... •64 'lbe focus on 
love as a god is dwindling, or falling into a state of lesser importance. 
This expansion of the realm in which love attracts things to one another 
beyond humanity, and as based on mere physical beauty, is an 
anticipation of Diotima's defmition of Love as the desire for the eternal 
possession of the universal good. We shall see how this unfolds in the 
second chapter. 
Although Eryximachus claims that the power of love has a 
universal domain, he focuses mainly on the body using the analO&Y of 
medicine, which is fitting for a physician such as himself. Again, as we 
6:;1 Plato, Symposium, 186a-b. 
63 1bid., 186b. 
64 Ibid.. 186a. 
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have seen in the speech of Pausanias, there are good and bad objects of 
desire, which themselves render the desires good or bad. Love itself is 
intermediate; the quality of the love depends upon the quality of its 
object. Eryximachus adopts Pausanias' principle into his own speech. Yet 
although Eryximachus says Pausanias' • ... division of Love into two sorts 
appears to . . . [be] a good one ... •, he will later refer to this characteristic 
of love as being a •double Love•, suggesting a differentiation of love rather 
than a division, thus maintaining love's wholeness. 65 
Eryximachus' speech is working on two levels: first, he is 
describing the unifying power of Love, and second, he is himself unifying 
that which has gone before him. For Pausanias, there are two distinct 
loves, whereas for Eryximachus, it seems that there is one power that 
presides over a multitude of things. • ... [U]niversal is the sway of this god 
over all affairs both human and divine, • claims Eryximachus. 66 Mitchell 
writes, paraphrasing Eryximachus, 
65Jbid. 
Eros has once more become one, complete. Never again in these 
speeches will he be divided as he has been up to now. 'Ibis new 
Eros has great - in fact, complete - power.67 
66Jbid.. 186a-b. 
67 Mitchell, p. 63. 
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These matters have yet to be dialectically established, yet the defining 
elements or love are being rhetorically brought out as we are going 
through. 
Continuing with his analogy or medicine, Eryximachus claims that 
the role or the physician is to cultivate and even create attractions within 
those parts or the body that yield healthy bodily states. Here we have a 
goal in mind, i.e., love's purpose is to produce some state. Although we 
have had the notion of immortality introduced to us by Phaedrus, the 
goal of love as such takes greater hold in Eryximachus' speech. Again, 
this is an anticipation of Diotima's claim that men desire the good to 
achieve the state of happiness, with which immortality is essentially 
connected. 'lbe healthy bodily state, according to Eryximachus, achieves 
a kind of hannony or attunement, a subject dealt with in great detail in 
both Plato's Phaedo and his Philebus. In addition to cultivating those 
attractions that give rise to healthy bodies, the physician also removes 
those attractions which give rise to unhealthy bodies. In this sense, what 
the physician does in the realm of the body, the lover, introduced by 
Pausanias as a kind of teacher of the beloved, does in the realm of the 
soul. 
The lover /beloved relationship has been and will be surpassed by 
Phaedrus and Aristophanes, respectively, and has even been surpassed 
by Pausanias although he fails to realize that he has done so. (Pausanias 
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points to the sow as the proper object of love yet hangs on to the 
physical sexual act.) There has been explicit rhetorical and implicit 
dialectical tension between the categories of 1over' and 'beloved' in 
relation to physical conduct, such that the categories in relation to such 
conduct are beginning to break down. However, the lover /beloved 
relationship does remain, yet in a new and altered state. 1be traditional 
lover/beloved relationship becomes a kind of teacher/student 
relationship, wherein love is still able to take its true fonn. Proper 
physical conduct, as will be demonstrated by Socrates in Alcibiades' 
speech, will change from that expressed by Pausanias, as will the object 
of desire change, this also ftrst made explicit by Pausanias. 
Eryximachus also speaks explicitly about the lover /beloved 
relationship, maintaining that such relationships can be healthy or 
unhealthy depending on that which is desired, just as the body can be 
made healthy or unhealthy depending upon the quality of the food that it 
desires. In this regard, he agrees with Pausanias' claim that the quality 
of the love, and indeed the quality of the lover him/herself, depends upon 
the quality of its or his/her object.68 He says, 
68 Pausanias says, •A lover is bad if he is of the common type, who loves the body rather 
than the mind. 'Ibis makes him inconstant, becauee there's no constancy in the object 
of his desires ... on the other hand, a lover who loves goodness of character is constant 
for life, becauee of the constancy of the object he's been united with.• (Plato, 
Symposium. 183cl-e.) 
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.. . it is right to yield to a virtuous and wrong to yield to a vicious 
lover, and similarly, in the case of the body, it is both right and 
necessary to gratify such desires as are sound and healthy in each 
particular case, . . . (b}ut it is utterly wrong to indulge such desires 
as are bad and morbid ... 69 
In Eryximachus' speech, we are somewhat in between what Pausanias 
and Diotima say concerning love. For Pausanias, there are two loves: the 
heavenly and the earthly Aphrodite, each with its representative lover, 
while for Diotima, love is explicitly universal desire, the object of which 
will emerge as the good. In Eryximachus' speech Love is not yet desire, 
but a single, universal power of attraction, according to which, one can 
be attracted to noble or base things. In what is explicitly a discussion of 
the proper practice of medicine, Eryximachus further explains what the 
lover does in his relationship with the beloved, thus further developing 
what Pausanias says about this relationship. The physician and the 
lover /teacher 
... can distinguish ... between the nobler and baser Loves, and can 
effect such alteration that the one passion is replaced by the other; 
and he will be deemed a good practitioner who is expert in 
producing Love where it ought to flourish but exists not, and in 
removing it from where it should not be. 70 
69 Ibid.. 186c. 
10 Ibid., 186c-d. 
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For the physician, the desire created and cultivated is among like parts 
of the body, thus giving rise to bodily health. For the lover/teacher, the 
desire created and cultivated is between beloved/ student and virtue, 
thus giving rise to psychical health. 
Rosen's misreading of the fli'St two speeches is carried into that of 
Eryximachus, for he is mistaken in saying that • ... the three defenders of 
pederasty are related by their selfishness. •n None should be classified as 
•defenders of pederastY', for not only is this not their intention, but not 
all of them even focus on pederasty. If we can classify the first three 
contributors to this moving dialectic as anything, they can be called 
'praisers of love'. But neither is this phrase accurate, for while each says 
he intends to praise love as a god, each moves toward the dialectical 
truth without explicitly realizing it: love is not a god. 
Rosen raises a problem, however: •If there is one Eros with a 
double propensity for evil as well as good [as in Eryximachus' rhetorical 
definition of love as the desire for either healthy or unhealthy things}, 
what is the principle by which Eros is guided in the proper direction?'12 I 
think it is clear from what has been said so far that the principle that 
guides Eros in the proper direction is the lover/teacher, whose conduct 
is introduced by Pausanias, yet is problematic as we have seen. 
71 Roam. p. 92. 
7l Roaen, pp. 100-1. 
42 
Furthermore, Eryximachus suggests that not only is this principle 
manifest in the loverfteacher, but in any specialist who cultivates these 
proper attractions. But later, love itself is claimed to be the guide, i.e., 
love is both that which is cultivated and that which cultivates. 1be lover 
has to direct the beloved toward those things that are worthy of love, i.e., 
virtue and the soul. How and whether this is possible is again another 
question, one which Socrates examines elsewhere. 73 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of Eryximachus, aside from his 
universaUzation of love as a cosmic principle of attraction, and the 
statement of consequences raised relating to the lover/beloved 
relationship, is his explicitly connecting humanity and divinity through 
the power of love, thus culminating in a communion between the two. 
Already this connection has been implicitly present since the speech of 
Phaedrus where love is intrinsically and intermediately connected to 
death and immortality. It is in Eryximachus' speech, however, that this 
connection reaches rhetorical completion. (We shall also see this 
73 In the .Meno we find that virtue seems to be something distinct from yet connected to 
knowledge, and thus according to the premiee 'If virtue is knowledge, then virtue can be 
taught', it aeema as though virtue cannot be taught. We ahall not pu.raue the intricacies 
of that c:tialogue; however, tbe theoJY of anamnesis leaves open the poeaibility that 
virtue can be recollected, and Socrates is eeen in that dialogue in the position of the 
teacher, not imparting knowledge from without, but reminding Meno's slaw boy or that 
which he etemaDy knows. In light of what Eryximachus •ys rhetorically about 
medicine, we move fUrther in understanding the lover /beloved relationllhip aa propoaecl 
by Pau81'nias. 1be lover must produce and cultivate a love of virtue in the beloved. Yet 
what is meant by cultivation requires further clarification. 
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connection demonstrated mythically in the speech of Aristophanes). In 
the speech of Diotima, this interrelationship is reached dialectically. 
Eryximachus is the first to introduce explicitly the notion of 
communion between humanity and divinity. This, Eryximachus claims, 
is the function of love. By its power alone humanity and divinity are 
brought together. Love, as a kinetic principle of attraction, i.e., what it 
has been since the beginning of the dialogue, rhetorically takes its proper 
Conn. This power of communion will dialectically emerge as the definitive 
role of love grasped as what Diotima will call an Mall powerful spirit". 74 
Here, in Eryximachus' speech, although not dialectically defined as such, 
appears the rhetorical notion of the role or love as a spirit in between 
humanity and divinity where, as Eryximachus says, it M... exerts . . . a 
complete power.•75 
As we have seen, whereas medicine requires the physician to 
regulate and cultivate certain organic attractions to create and maintain 
health in the body, Eryximachus introduces the notion of the diviner who 
is required to regulate those desires of humans that give rise to proper 
relationships with the gods. Eryximachus says, 
... all sacrifices and ceremonies controlled by divination, namely, 
all means of communion between gods and men, are only 
74 Plato, Syrraposium, 202f. 
75 Ibid., 188d. 
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concerned with either the preservation or the cure of love [i.e., 
producing the proper and orderly love).76 
Again, love is, as Eryximachus says, a force of attraction. Humanity's 
relationship to the gods is dependent upon that which humanity desires. 
Eryximachus defines impiety as •. .. the result of refusing to gratify the 
orderly Love or to honour and prefer him in all our affairs, ... (as opposed 
to) yielding to the other [Love) ... rn By this definition then, piety is the 
result or consequence of the gratification of the orderly love, i.e., the 
attraction to those things that give rise to bodily and psychical health or 
attunement. Pausanias has told us that virtue and the development of 
the soul are among these proper objects of love. 
Eryximachus says that it is the task of the diviner to produce and 
cultivate this love in the same way that the physician produces and 
cultivates the proper love in the body. He says, 
To divination is appointed the task of supervising and treating the 
health of these Loves; wherefore that art, as lmowing what human 
love-affairs will lead to seemliness and pious observance, is indeed 
a purveyor of friendship between gods and men. 78 
The lover, therefore, in the lover/beloved relationship, which is evolving 
into a dialectical teacher 1 student relationship, acts as a diviner, 
76 Ibid., 188b-c. 
77 Ibid.. 188c. 
78 Ibid., 188c-d. 
45 
cultivating the proper love in the beloved and thus giving rise to 
psychical health and piety, just as the physician gives rise to bodily 
health and piety. Piety is the ultimate goal here, for it is piety, as earlier 
demonstrated by Phaedrus' examples, which achieves the favour or the 
gods and therefore, immortality. 79 Simply put, Love provides salvation, a 
notion that is further developed in the speech or Aristophanes. 
Furthermore, as I have just suggested, if it is this proper love 
which the gods themselves love, then universally, this love, wherever it is 
cultivated, contributes to the salvation of humanity. Universally, piety, as 
Eryximachus rhetorically defines it here, is the gratification or the orderly 
love. The physician, in his cultivation or the proper attractions in the 
body also exhibits piety, thus contributing to the salvation or his patient 
and himself, just as the teacher, in cultivating this same love in the 
mind, contributes to the salvation or the student. The objects or love are 
important insofar as their attractions exhibit this orderly love; some or 
the examples or them have been virtue, the soul, self-sacrifice, and 
certain hannot!ized parts of the body. However, the proper or orderly love 
is universal in its power, i.e., it can be, as Eryximachus says, found in all 
affairs human and non-human; its power is complete. 
79 Alcestis and AcbiUes are mnrded with immortality for their actions in aa:orclance 
with the harmonious love, i.e., the love with the proper object. 
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The physician knows which attractions are manifestations of the 
orderly love and cultivates them, thus giving rise to bodily health. 
He/she is pious insofar as he/she gratifies this orderly love. 'lbe diviner 
is a special case, for what are like parts of the body in medicine are 
analogous to humanity and divinity in divination. The diviner lmows 
which attractions between men and gods are manifestations of the 
orderly love. The diviner gratifies the orderly love between gods and men 
and in doing so, is pious. Generally however,. anyone in his/her techne or 
art who cultivates this love, which still has yet to be dialectically defined 
and established, is a diviner. It seems as well that true opinion on these 
matters is enough to cultivate these love affairs, as is evident in 
Phaedrus' examples, and from what I have taken from the Meno. 80 
Eryximachus continues with this notion of salvation, which has been 
implicitly present from the beginning in relation to death and 
immortality. Most importantly, Eryximachus presents love as that power 
which renders possible communion between the gods and men. 
Aristophanes will take up this notion of salvation in his commentary on 
eo One might aak here: where does the philoaopher fit in? The philoaopher ia the lover of 
wisdom who practices his/her art in dialectic. He/she posaeaaea tnle opinion and 
cultivates it in otbera through diacusaion, giving riae to a love of wiadom and virtue. 
Thus, the pbiJoaopher is the completion of the teacher in the lover/beloved relationship. 
We should look to Socrates' behaviour if ~ wiah to aee wbat exactly it is that the 
phDoaopber does. "'bis will be examined in Chapter 3. 
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the human condition and its intrinsic relation to love and the longing for 
completion. 
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1. 4 THE SPEECH OF ARJSTOPHANFS 
Having looked at the rhetorically presented notions of piety and 
impiety in the speech of Eryximachus, we shall now examine their 
movement into the speech of Aristophanes. He tells us a myth, somewhat 
similar to the tower of Babel story in the Bible, about the consequences 
of the ultimate hubris and impiety, and how our once-complete selves, 
completely unaided, attempted • ... to scale the heights of heaven and set 
upon the gods.•81 
Aristophanes begins by speaking of the power of love, which he 
mistakenly identifies as a great god, as do all those who have gone before 
him. He says, 
He of all gods is most friendly to men; he succow-s mankind and 
heals those ills whose cure must be the highest happiness of the 
human race.82 
If love is to succour humanity, as Aristophanes suggests, then humanity 
must be in some distress. 'Ibis distress is want, and it is a result of our 
great impiety, as he will tell us in what, of all the speeches, is the most 
dramatic and vivid account of the human condition. The myth of the 
circle-people is a brilliant, and at the same time comic and tragic, 
explanation of human nature. In short, Aristophanes claims that each 
at Ibid., 190b. See Genesis 11: 1-9. 
1:1 Ibid., 189d. 
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human being longs for completion or wholeness. Originally he says, each 
being was in fact two beings in one. Anyone who reads Plato's 
Symposium cannot forget Aristophanes' description of these beings, each 
with two faces (one on either side of the head), with four anns and four 
legs attached to their round bodies. Furthermore, he claims that there 
were not two but three sexes, for each being, as composed of what we 
now would take to be two beings, was either male-male, female-female, 
or male-female. 
This heretofore strange and comical story, however, takes a 
dramatic and tragic tum. Aristophanes says, 
Now, they were of surprising strength and vigour, and so lofty in 
their notions that they even conspired against the gods; and the 
same story is told of them as Homer relates of Ephialtes and Otus, 
that scheming to assault the gods in fight they essayed to mount 
high heaven. 83 
Impiety, fli'St introduced explicitly by Eryximachus, is now given a 
dramatic context. In this classic example of the Greek notion of hubris, 
the circle-people overestimate their own ability and power, thinking 
themselves to be greater than the gods. Zeus, however, splits each being 
in half. As in the Babel story where the people are scattered, these now-
split circle-beings are scattered as well. Splitting, confusing, and 
scattering, both in Aristophanes' myth and in the tower of Babel story 
13 Ibid.' 190b-c:. 
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are ways to deal with impiety. This splitting is a denial and removal of 
power - what Aristophanes himself calls, •... a lessening of their 
strength.•84 Furthermore, there is the prospect of being split again •if 
they continue turbulent and do not chose to keep quiet ... •85 
Aristophanes then tells us of how Apollo went about healing these 
people. However, he says, 
Now when our first form had been cut in two, each half in longing 
for its fellow would come to it again; and then they would fling 
their anns about each other and in mutual embraces yearn to be 
grafted together ... 86 
Thus, Zeus, through further manipulation of their anatomy, made 
possible • ... conception and continuation of their kind ... •87 In each 
being's longing for its other half, be it male for male, female for female, 
male for female, or female for male, we have Aristophanes' mythical 
deduction of the sexual preferences. While the heterosexual relationship 
is presented as being more advantageous to the extent that its union 
begets children, Aristophanes gives precedence to the traditional male 
lover /beloved relationship. He has no dialectical ground to do so, but has 
again, as we have seen in the speech of Pausanias, fallen into this social 
form. In his presentation, there is no dialectical reason to make either 
84 Ibid., 190c. 
115 Ibid.. 190d. 
!6lbfd., 19la. 
•
7 Ibid., 191c. 
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sexual preference greater than the other. Although Aristophanes 
particularizes the desire of the lover •... to be joined and fused with his 
beloved that the two might be made one• in the male-male relationship, 
this desire is universal, i.e., no matter what the relationship, this desire 
exists. Remember that the superiority of this relationship has been under 
some tension since the speech of Phaedrus, as we have seen. 
Aristophanes, in his summary of the moral of this myth 
rhetorically defines love. He says, 
The cause of it all (i.e., the longing or desire] is this, that our 
original form was as I have described, and we were entire; and the 
craving and pursuit of that entirety is called love. Formerly, as I 
have said, we were one; but now for our sins we are all dispersed 
by God ... 88 
We had thought that we could reach heaven on our own, but as 
Phaedrus has said from the beginning, love •... is the cause of all our 
highest blessings . . . without which it is impossible for city or person to 
perform any high and noble deeds. •89 Aristophanes tells us why the lover 
loves, using the tenn ,over' generally here. He presents love as a desire 
for completion, and implicitly shows us why the lover is not selfish. What 
we implicitly have is an absolute self reflection of the one into the other. 
The lover sees himself in the one he loves and at the same time sees the 
!! Ibid., 192e-193a. 
19 Ibid.' 178c-d. 
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one he loves in himself. 'Ibis occurs here at the level of true opinion and 
is present at the start in Phaedrus' speech: the lover on the battlefield 
inspired by love acts courageously yet lmows not why he acts so. He is 
unaware that it is himself he sees in the beloved and the beloved he sees 
in himself in a mutual self-accountability. The soul, as we have seen 
rhetorically, is the proper object of love, and it is the soul that is the 
same in the lover and the beloved. This notion of self reflection and the 
difficult problem of the one and the many are dealt with more explicitly 
in Plato's Phaedrus, in which Socrates says (here in relation to the 
beloved), 
. . . he loves, yet knows not what he loves; he does not understand, 
he cannot tell what has come upon him ... he cannot account for 
it, not realizing that his lover is as it were a mirTor in which he 
beholds himself. 90 
This look into the Phaedrus points toward an important aspect of this 
desire to be made whole. As Martha Nussbaum points out, the desire for 
completion is not merely physical as one might interpret from 
Aristophanes' explicit focus on bodies: there is a psychical aspect as well. 
Nussbaum writes, 
But this impossible stoty of welding [i.e., physical pt"'CCeation) is a 
far simpler miracle than the one that would have to take place if 
90 Plato, Phaedrus, 255d. 
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they were really to become one. For these creatures have souls; 
and their desire for unity is a desire of the soul, a desire of desires, 
projects, [and] aspirations ... 91 
The focus on the mingling of souls rather than that of bodies is taken up 
by Socrates in his speech and concretized in his behaviour in the speech 
of Alcibiades. However, it is important to note at this point that the soul 
as well as the body desires the completion described by Aristophanes. 
Aristophanes gives us a mythical genealogy of love. Love is both 
the consequence of impiety and the mode through which we can now 
attain salvation. Love comes after the ultimate impious act, for only after 
this act is love needed. By embracing love, Aristophanes says, it is 
possible to attain friendship with the gods; for as the previous speakers 
have shown us, particularly Eryximachus, it is the cultivation of this love 
that pleases god. Through this cultivation, we attain salvation. 
Aristophanes says, 
... we ought all to exhort others to a pious observance of the gods 
in all things, so that we may escape harm and attain to bliss under 
the ga11ant leadership of Love. Let none in act oppose him - and it 
is opposing him to incur the hate of Heaven: if we make friends 
with the god and are reconciled, we shall have the fortune that falls 
to few in our day, of discovering our proper favorites.92 
91 Nuaebaum. p. 175. 
92 Plato, Symposium, 193a-b. 
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Love is characterized as a leader, helping us to act piously. •Love is the 
god who brings this about; he fully deserves our hymns• exclaims 
Aristophanes. 93 Certainly love does indeed deserve these hymns, but not 
as a god, as we shall see. 
Aristophanes• great achievement is his contribution of the 
anagogical role of love. The focus of his speech is on salvation, which is 
achieved only by our completion. Love, he claims, is itself both the desire 
for and pursuit of wholeness and that through which this wholeness can 
be attained. Although explicitly calling love a god, Aristophanes' 
description of love depicts it as something quite different from both god 
and man, yet acting on behalf of both, bringing each to the other. 
Aristophanes' distinction between love and god prepares for Diotima's 
defmition of love as mediator. Again, love is the dynamic through which 
the virtues are realized. In Phaedrus' speech the virtue is courage, 
whereas for Aristophanes, it is piety. Piety is brought about by love, thus 
making peace with god beyond the iniquity of humanity. 
93 Ibid.' 193d. 
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1. 5 THE SPEECH OF AGATHON 
Initially, the speech of Agathon seems like a step back from that of 
Aristophanes and perhaps even those of Eryximachus and Pausanias. 
However, this being the last speech before that of Socrates, it acts as a 
set-up for the explicit dialectical inquiry to come. Not only is Agathon's 
the fll'st speech to raise explicitly the notion of definition, but the speech 
itself demonstrates the need for such definition. 'lbe great achievement of 
Agathon is his bringing into the dialectic the explicit notion of definition 
and the suggestion of a dialectical method, after which there should be 
no turning back. Agathon, however, in his own speech fails to put into 
place the method he himself suggests. First, Agathon tells us the method 
he will use, and at the same time, expresses his dissatisfaction with the 
previous speeches. 
I'd like to start my speech by explaining the tactics of my speeches, 
before actually turning to my speech. You see, I think that all the 
previous speakers weren \ really praising the god; they were 
congratulating the human race on how much they thrive on goods 
the god contrives. Nothing has been said, however, about the 
actual nature of the being who bestows these gifts. 94 
As I have suggested, the nature of love as a god, as Agathon here points 
out, has never been the focus of any of the previous speeches. The 
94 Ibid., 194e-195a. 
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nature of love is presupposed, and thus the godhood of love is never 
questioned. 
Agathon now continues by telling us how his speech will proceed: 
But there is only one correct approach in composing a eulogy, 
whatever the topic, and that is to define what the being who is the 
subject of the speech is in fact like, and what benefits he is 
responsible for. Accordingly, the proper tactics for us too, in 
dealing with Love, are first to praise his nature, and then his 
gift 95 s. 
Notice how Agathon fmishes off this introduction. He complains that the 
nature of love has yet to be discussed. He is moving toward the notion of 
definition and the process of the dialectical method. Yet after this great 
insight, he closes the discussion of his method by saying that they now 
must •praise• Love's nature, not, as he has suggested, define Love's 
nature. Thus, while Agathon is the first to raise explicitly the notion of 
definition, the purpose of the dialectical method, he fails to utilize this 
advance in his own speech. 
Many of the scholars who are critical of the speeches before that of 
Socrates are most so toward that of Agathon. Cobb, who has, on the 
contrary, been more sympathetic toward the other speeches, taking 
seriously the view that they each have something to offer, does not go 
gs Ibid., 195. Lamb translates thia p&ll88&e, -rbere ia but one correct method ... •. 
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easy on Agathon. He says, -The reader is prepared for the worse from 
Agathon's speech, and we are not disappointed.1196 He continues, 
[The] self-referential character is especially obvious in Agathon's 
speech. One can easily believe that he has himself in mind as he 
lists the characteristics of the god: youthful, handsome, graceful, 
wise, superior to all in his skill as a poet, etc. 97 
In his speech, Agathon emphasizes the mistake that he himself points 
out in his introduction by praising that which has yet to be defined. This, 
however, is the last speech before that of Socrates, and it seems that 
Plato is setting Agathon up as a kind of transition or mediation between 
the first four speeches and that of Socrates. 1be claim that love is a god 
will be defeated by Socrates in short order as a kind of introduction to 
Socrates' speech. Agathon, however, is compensated by being the one 
who raises the all important notions of definition and method, even if he 
himself fails to utilize them. 
Agathon's idea of a definition is that of an enumeration of 
properties. He begins, •... while all gods are blissful, Love . . . is the most 
blissful, as being the most beautiful and the best . .ga In addition to 
presupposing that love is indeed a god, he merely describes the 
properties that he believes love to possess. While each of these qualities 
96 Cobb, p. 68. 
tn Ibid., p. 69. 
98 Plato, Symposium, 195a. 
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might be part of the nature of love (we shall find out in the next chapter 
that none of them are), Agathon does not give us the essence, mistaking 
it for its properties. Furthermore, in his failure to apply reason and 
dialectical argument to what he says, he fails further in that the 
properties he mentions are not even properties of love. Without a true 
definition of the nature or essence of love, the properties of it cannot 
properly be derived. 
Although the importance of definition is Agathon's great 
contribution to the emerging dialectic, there are a few more things in his 
speech worth noting in relation to the other speeches. Agathon, like 
those before him, makes rhetorical progress in describing what love is 
like. He does not define what love is, as I have shown, but his description 
adds and fleshes out, even if rhetorically, what is established dialectically 
by Socrates. Agathon claims in his description that love is not corporeal. 
What is moving in this description is the implicit truth that love is 
neither god nor man, but spirit, as we shall see in Chapter 2. Agathon 
says, 
[Love] ... lives and moves in the softest environment of all. You see, 
he makes his home in gods' and men's dispositions and minds-
and even then, not indiscriminately in every mind, because he 
withdraws whenever he encounters a mind with a hard disposition 
and stays only where he finds one that is soft. 99 
99 Plato, Symposium, 195e. 
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Again, as we have observed from the start, love is separate from god and 
men. Although Agathon claims that love is a god, he describes love in 
such a way as to distinguish its nature from that of the gods. Love is 
constantly, yet implicitly, throughout the dialogue, being presented as 
being somehow in between god and man, despite the fact that each 
speaker explicitly claims that love is itself a god. Agathon perpetuates 
this inconsistency as well in that he claims that love is a god, yet he 
distinguishes love from divinity as well as humanity. He does this in his 
description of where it is that love resides. Love is neither in the physical 
human world, being non-corporeal itself, nor does love reside in the 
realm of the gods. Agathon is explicitly clear that love somehow resides 
in the minds of both men and gods. Love, by necessity, has to be both 
part of, yet separate from, the two realms which it is to unite. Agathon 
provides the context within which love performs its salvific function as 
rhetorically presented by those speakers before him. He also claims that 
there is a condition to love's being present within one's mind, be it that of 
a god or man. He is not particularly clear as to what he means by 'hard' 
and 'soft', yet suggests that the disposition of one in whose mind love is 
to reside must be of a certain character. One must prepare him/herself 
for love's presence. Again, the cultivation of love, as earlier described by 
Eryximachus, must be worked toward. 
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Agathon, as do Phaedrus, Eryximachus, and Aristophanes, 
presents love as that power which brings about virtuous conduct. Like 
these other speakers, Agathon favours a particular virtue in his 
description of this power: temperance. Agathon not only places love in 
relation to temperance, but he almost identifies each with the other. He 
says, 
We all agree that temperance is a control of pleasures and desires, 
while no pleasure is stronger than Love: if they are the weaker, 
they must be under Love's control, and he is their controller; so 
that Love, by controlling pleasures and desires, must be eminently 
temperate. 100 
The relation between love and temperance here is a little different from 
love's relations to the other virtues as they have been presented by the 
previous speakers. 1be previous speakers claim that love brings about 
courage and piety, inspiring the lover to virtuous action. Here, however, 
Agathon claims that love itself is temperate. 'lbe previous speakers have 
not explicitly said that love is courageous or pious, for love has no 
knowledge of these virtues. Temperance, however, is a little dift'erent, for 
it is itself, Hke love, in between reason and passion. Temperance, for 
Plato, occurs when reason, through the exercise of the will, controls the 
passions. Temperance is a mean: one can indulge in certain things, but 
100 Ibid., 196c. 
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not to excess, recalling the point Eryximachus made •. .. we set high 
importance on a right use of the appetite for dainties of the table, that we 
may cull the pleasure without disease."101 Love, like temperance, involves 
the correct attractions to the correct objects. 
Agathon, like Aristophanes, says that love •... makes himself our 
leader."102 He describes love as • ... our trustiest helmsman, boatswain, 
champion, deliverer; .. . leader fair and best, whom everyone should 
follow ... "103 This crucial aspect of love, as a dynamic mediator through 
which humanity attains salvation, is developed to its completion in the 
speech of Socrates. 
Love has been rhetorically and developmentally shown by our first 
four speakers to be a universal principle of attraction, providing true 
opinion of virtue, explicitly courage in Phaedrus, piety in Eryximachus 
and Aristophanes, and temperance in Agathon. Love also gives us the 
ability to act on this true opinion of virtue; i.e., while at this point it is 
implicit that love is not a virtue itself, it is now explicitly the dynamic 
through which virtue is realized. This principle exists somehow in 
between humanity and divinity, bringing each toward the other. 
101 Ibid., 187e. 
un Ibid., 197d. 
103 lllid.. 197e. 
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(Remember that according to Aristophanes, the gods need man as much 
as man needs the gods. Although the point might be valid, it is 
rhetorically made.)104 Furthermore, love has been seen to be a longing for 
things that can be either helpful or detrimental. It has been rhetorically 
stated that the proper objects of love are eternal things such as virtue 
and the soul. Universally and dialectically, the object of desire will 
become the good in Socrates' speech. Furthermore, love is a longing for 
completion. Love has come about as a consequence of human impiety 
and is needed for that impiety to be rectified. It is a guide that leads us to 
completion and salvation. Love has been said to be a great god, but a god 
who acts on behalf of humanity. It has been stated by each speaker that 
love is a god, but this claim has been presupposed. 'nlroughout their 
descriptions of love, however, love is seen to be separate from the gods, 
in between humanity and divinity, thus creating a tension between what 
is explicitly said and what is rhetorically implied. None of the speakers 
focuses on love's godhood as his topic, but rather, each rhetorically 
examines the nature or love and what it does. Furthermore, we have seen 
love presented in two different ways. In one sense, love is an emotion; the 
longing expressed by Aristophanes is a preclialectical description of what 
will explicitly become desire in the speech or Diotima. In the second 
104 lbitL, 190c. 
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sense, love is presented as a conscious being, rhetorically identified as a 
god up to this point, who is capable of anagogical action. 'lbese two sides 
of love, Eros the god and eros the emotion will be united by Diotima in 
the notion of the spirit or 6afJ.lQV. All of this has been stated rhetorically. 
We shall now see these rhetorical truths established dialectically in the 
speech of Socrates. Essentially, these elements will remain, though given 
dialectical form and ground. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LOVE IS GROUNDED 
2.1 SOCRATESANDAGATHON 
Love has been presented to us by the fU'St five speakers. The 
speech of Socrates, which aside from his questioning of Agathon is 
mainly an account or a number or past discussions with Diotima, will 
now dialectically ground love. We will see, however, that Diotima not only 
uses Socrates' dialectical method or question and answer, but also uses 
rhetoric to describe the nature and function of love. These switches from 
dialectic to rhetoric and back again are easily identified in the text and 
perhaps represent the union of dialectic and rhetoric in language, despite 
their ditTerences, as noted in the Introduction. Perhaps this also allows 
Plato some rhetorical room to describe this difficult and complex doctrine 
by placing it in the mouth of Diotima rather than Socrates. On the most 
fundamental level, neither dialectic nor rhetoric is completely separable 
from the other for they are both united in language. In any case, it is 
understandable that this discourse on love, which is forever •in between• 
a number of opposite poles, be given in a manner which is itself •m 
between. • Let us now see how the grounding or this doctrine of love 
unfolds. 
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Socrates, in the prelude to his narration of the discourse between 
himself and Diotima, begins by asking some questions of Agathon. 'Ibe 
significance of this exchange is that first, Socrates dialectically defeats in 
short order, the claim that love is a god, and secondly, he sets the stage 
for the dialectical method which now explicitly takes hold. The exchange 
is a response to Agathon's speech, which we have just heard; yet the 
claim Socrates corrects, i.e., that love is a god, has been made by all of 
the previous speakers. 'Ibis correction, i.e., that love is not in fact a god, 
however, is not the 'death blow' to the previous speeches, as some 
scholars think. As I have argued, this claim that love is a god, while 
made by each speaker, is the explicit subject of none of the speeches 
since the notion of definition had not arisen until the speech of Agathon 
which then proceeded to ignore it. In fact, none of the speakers so far 
have dealt with the claim in any detail at all. It is presupposed by each 
speaker and made almost in passing by each of them. The dialectical 
conclusion that love is not a god does little, if anything, to shake the 
groundwork that has been established so far. Furthermore, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, Agathon introduces the notion of definition, 
and in this way, sets the stage for Socrates' dialectical argument 
regarding the nature of love. Socrates will arrive at both the essence of 
love, from which its properties are derived, and the true nature of its 
object. Although the consensus in the scholarship is that this prelude is 
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"straightforward•, it does make these essential advances in the moving 
dialectic.105 Let us now look at the argument in detail. 
Socrates asks Agathon whether or not it is necessary to love's 
nature that love be love of something, i.e., whether or not it must have 
an object. Like the notions of father and mother, the notion of love, by 
necessity, analytically entails an accompanying object. A father, by 
necessity, is a father of a son or daughter, without at least one of which, 
the notion of -rather' is nonsensical. So too must love, Agathon agrees, be 
love of something; i.e., love is relational. (We shall soon see the beginning 
of the development of what this something is.) Furthennore, love • ... 
desires the particular thing that is his object.•U)6 Love, in this dialectical 
context, is now explicitly desire, whereby according to necessity the lover 
is related to his/her object through the dynamic of desire, the general 
form or which is the desire to possess something. This notion of 
possession has not been central to the focus of any or the speeches so 
far, save that or Aristophanes who mentions the desire to possess 
completion, which entails the 'possession' of the other half, so to speak. 
This notion of possession develops throughout Socrate;s' speech however; 
hence it does certainly remain in the picture. 
105 See Cobb, p. 70. 
106 Plato, Symposium. 200a. 
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Socrates elaborates on this relation making the claim that, • ... as a 
necessity . . . the desiring subject must have a desire for something it 
lacks, and again, no desire if it has no lack."107 'lbe tall man, he says, 
does not desire to be tall nor does the strong man desire to be strong, for 
each already possesses the characteristic desired. To such people who 
claim to desire that which they already possess, Socrates says, -when 
you say - I desire these present things - we suggest you are merely saying 
-I wish these things now present to be present also in the .{uture.•toe Only 
in this way, Socrates claims, can one desire, and therefore love, that 
which is already present. Socrates summarizes what has been 
established so far: 
... all who feel desire, feel it for what is not provided or present; for 
something they have not or are not or lack; and that sort of thing 
is the object of desire and love.I09 
We now have the conditions, established dialectically, whereby a thing 
can rightfully be an object of desire and love. Desire is a consequence of 
a lack or deficiency, whereby the subject desires or loves that which is 
not present. Aristophanes' speech is brought to mind here in that he too 
presents love as a desire brought about by a deficiency. Socrates, 
however, dialectically grounds the point Aristophanes made rhetorically 
107 Ibid., 200b. 
108 Ibid., 200d. 
109 Ibid., 200e. 
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in his speech by eliciting love's relation to a desired object. The object or 
desire is that which the lover lacks, the possession of which gives rise to 
his/her completion. We have yet to see dialectically what the object of 
desire and the completion attained are explicitly; yet we now have the 
conditions in place. 
Socrates agrees with Agathon, however, that love is always love of 
the beautiful, never of the ugly. Agathon has said in his speech, 
Hence also those dealings of the gods were contrived by Love -
clearly love of beauty - astir in them, for Love has no concern with 
ugliness.llO 
We must give Agathon credit in that even in his rhetorical speech, beauty 
is not confmecl to the body. As we have seen, Agathon speaks of the soul 
and mind, each or which must have the proper disposition for love to 
take up residence. For Agathon, beauty is not merely physical. Socrates 
agrees that love is always or the beautiful saying, •... the gods contrived 
the world from a love or beautiful things, for of the ugly there was no 
love.•111 He then says, according to what has been dialectically 
established so far concerning the conditions of the object of love, that if 
love is only of the beautiful, and the object of desire must be lacking in 
the desiring subject, then it follows that love does not possess the 
110 Ibid.. 197b. 
111 Ibid., 20la. 
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beautiful. Furthermore, if beautiful things are good things (and implicitly 
one cannot be one without the other), then love does not possess the 
good. That which lacks beauty cannot be beautiful, and that which lacks 
the good cannot be good. 
Socrates' argument here can get a little confusing. 1be way in 
which these matters are put raises the problem of the self-predication of 
love, i.e., there is a logical tension each time Socrates says that «love 
loves'. Remember that love is being spoken and thought of on two levels. 
First, we have 'Love, the god', the notion of which has been dialectically 
defeated. However, this aspect of love as a kind of being, though no 
longer a god, is maintained and is still present. Love still has this aspect 
of some sort of being. This first level is maintained by Diotima in her 
speaking of love as a spirit, as we shall see. Whatever love is, he/she/it 
loves, i.e., desires, beautiful and good things. Secondly, we have 'desiring 
love', spoken of as an emotion. Seen in this way, whoever or whatever 
~ the being' is, this being loves/desires beautiful things. Love has 
been presented from the start, though not explicitly, as having a kind of 
dual being. The idea of 'Love, the god' entails what love is, while that of 
'love, the desire' entails what love does. Thus, if we keep these two 
aspects or love in mind, there should be no logical problem in saying that 
'Love loves', even if what is meant by this is not exactly clear. 
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To put both aspects together t we might say that love is a relational being, 
i.e., what will dialectically come to be spirit. Furthermore, whatever is 
established concerning Love's loving, the same is also true of the love of 
any finite being or thing, e.g., when it is said that Love loves only the 
beautiful, so too does man love only the beautiful. 
Many scholars have noted a problem with Socrates' argument that 
love is not beautifu1.112 Remember that he has set up the condition that 
one cannot desire that which he/she already possesses (the tall man 
cannot desire to be tall nor the strong man desire to be strong), unless 
what is meant by this is that he/ she desires to keep on possessing the 
present object into the future, i.e., he/she desires for something not yet 
present - future possession. Perhaps then, Agathon should not agree so 
readily with Socrates that love must not be beautiful. Certainly Love 
loves the beautiful; yet according to Socratest condition, this need not 
imply that love itself is not beautiful. Perhaps love, like the tall man and 
the strong man, is in fact beautiful, yet loves beauty in that it desires to 
possess beauty into the future. The problem, then, is that according to 
this condition, it is not by necessity that love is not beautiful. 
Furthennore, there is the further theological problem that if the gods love 
the beautiful, then they too must either lack beauty or fear losing it in 
n:z E.g., Bloom, p. 499; Cobb, pp. 70-1; Roaen. pp. 220-1. 
71 
the future; wherefore they cannot be eternal and unchanging. Plato 
seems to overlook this theological complication. While we should not 
merely overlook this problem, perhaps we can 'cut Plato some slack' if we 
further examine what he is trying to do here. 
Bloom criticizes this exchange between Socrates and Agathon on 
two grounds. First, he seems to think that the exchange is superficially 
simplistic; and secondly, he has a problem with this theological tension 
that many readers of the Symposium have noted. He writes, 
This superficial, although useful, conversation with Agathon points 
to the depths but passes over them and continues with the gentle 
Agathon acquiescing to Socrates' argument that Eros cannot be 
beautifu1.113 
Bloom says that the implication that the gods, like love, must lack 
beauty • ... is an important theological point, not emphasized by Socrates 
here, but absolutely essential to his thought.•114 'Ibe exchange, for 
reasons I have explained above, is hardly superficial. However, I think 
that Plato's/Socrates' overlooking of this exception that one can desire 
what one possesses, provided that what he/she really means by this 
desire is to keep on possessing it, points to what Plato himself is trying to 
emphasi2. What this argument serves is the fact that love, since it is not 
beautiful, is something separate from the gods. Again, Plato shows us 
113 Bloom, p. 499. 
114Jbid. 
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that love is somewhere in between humanity and divinity, its mediation 
being a heretofore implicit dialectical trend continuing throughout the 
dialogue since the speech of Phaedrus. Thus, I agree with Bloom insofar 
as Plato overlooks this theological difficulty, but I think he overlooks this 
point to make a greater one, one by which we should not be surprised at 
this point, namely that love is in between humanity and divinity. That 
Plato is emphasizing this point here is further supported by what is to 
come; for what follows is Socrates' account of his discussions with 
Diotima wherein love is dialectically shown to be a spirit or mediation 
between man and divinity. 
Socrates ends his questioning of Agathon with a beautifully 
humble distinction between himself and the moving objective dialectic, 
which, not incidentally, has been implicitly progressing throughout the 
dialogue. Socrates, having concluded •. .. if Love lacks beautiful things, 
and good things are beautiful, he must lack good things too", Agathon 
responds, •1 see no means, Socrates, of contradicting you . . . let it be as 
you say. "115 Socrates replies, •No, it is Truth, my loveable Agathon, whom 
you cannot contradict: Socrates you easily may.•l 16 Socrates has raised 
the standard of what the proper method of investigation should be; the 
truth of anything that has been and will be said of love is independent of 
11s Plato, Symposium, 20lc. 
ll6Jbid. 
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the speaker; thus again is stressed the importance of the contributions of 
all the speakers in the Symposium. The dialectic is independent, and 
therefore, dialectical ground is made even when the speaker is unaware 
of it. (Pausanias' speech is a good example of this, for reasons I have 
discussed). Socrates has opened his questioning of Agathon by stating 
his dissatisfaction with the way in which the speeches were made. 
Socrates says, 
... 1 was ignorant of the method in which eulogies ought to be made 
... [f]or I was such a silly wretch as to think that one ought in each 
case to speak the truth about the person eulogized .. . But now, it 
appears that this is not what is meant by a good speech of praise: 
which is rather an ascription of all the highest and fairest qualities, 
whether the case be so or not: it is really no matter if they are 
untrue.ll7 
Having shown us the proper method of reasoning one must use when 
investigating the nature of a thing, Socrates will now • ... speak the mere 
truth in [his) own way ... •118 Socrates tells us the method he will use, and 
accordingly, I shall divide this chapter into two parts, following Socrates' 
division. He says, •So first, Agathon, I must unfold, in your manner of 
exposition, who and what sort of being is Love, and then I shall tell of his 
works.•119 Thus, Socrates himself recognizes his pre-dialectical debt to 
Agathon who first raised the notion of definition. These next two sections, 
117 Ibid.' 198cl-e. 
lliiJbid., 199b. 
ut Ibid., 201e. 
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however, often overlap, thus reflecting the way in which Diotima's 
discussion of the nature and function of love, which Socrates will relate 
to us, intertwines them both. 
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2. 2 SOCRATES AND DIOTIMA (What Love Is) 
One of the main threads of consistency throughout the whole 
dialectic so far is that love's nature is such that it resides between two 
extremes. Love has been presented by the first five speakers as being 
between virtue and vice, life and death, ignorance and knowledge, and 
mortality and immortality. Phaedrus has presented love as being the 
dynamic through which virtue is realized, explicitly in relation to 
courage. The lover acts courageously, yet does not express as known that 
particular virtue; he has tnte opinion of courage. Eryximachus and 
Aristophanes place love between impiety and piety, elevating love to the 
status of that which provides humanity with salvation. When he first 
spoke with Diotima, Socrates thought, as did the other speakers, that 
love was a god, both beautiful and good. Upon hearing Diotima's 
arguments, i.e., those which he presented to Agathon above, Socrates 
thought then that love must be ugly and bad. We should not be 
surprised at this point, if we have taken the first speakers seriously 
enough, that Diotima proposes that there is something between these 
two poles as well. She asks Socrates, 
.. . do you imagine that whatever is not beautiful must needs be 
ugly ... and what is not skilled, ignorant? Have you not observed 
that there is something halfway between skill and ignorance?120 
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This is where Diotima raises explicitly the notion of true opinion and its 
relation to love. As we have seen, this notion has been present implicitly 
from the start with the speech of Phaedrus. Not only is love like true 
opinion in that both are between two poles, but much more importantly, 
love has an intrinsic relation to true opinion in that love seems to 
cultivate it in the lover, thus moving him/her to virtuous action, 
accordingly. To repeat what Phaedrus says, the lover, as we have seen, 
indeed acts courageously; the act of the lover is the same as that of the 
innately courageous person. Yet, a distinction between the two must be 
made. The lover does not act out of a lmowledge of courage; thus he 
cannot be said to possess courage. However, his act is the same as the 
innately courageous person's act, and thus he cannot be said to be 
ignorant of the virtue. Diotima now makes the needed distinction 
between them dialectically clear for us: 
You lmow, of course, that to have correct opinion, if you can give 
no reason for it, is neither fulllmowledge - how can an unreasoned 
thing be lmowledge? - nor yet ignorance; for what hits on the truth 
cannot be ignorance. So correct opinion, I take it, is just in that 
position, between understanding and ignorance.l:Zl 
We now have the distinction between the one who lmows and the one 
with true opinion in the context of the Symposium. We have already 
131 Ibid.. 202a. 
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noted the distinction between lmowledge and true opinion in the Meno in 
Chapter 1; and here, we see Diotima taking the same position that 
Socrates takes in the Meno. Drawing the analogy between love and true 
opinion, Diotima teaches, 
Likewise with Love, when you find yourself admitting that he is not 
good or beautiful, do not therefore suppose that he must be ugly 
and bad, but something betwixt the two.l22 
Love is now dialectically grounded as an intermediate being according to 
the argument that desire/love analytically entails a lack or deficiency, yet 
not so complete a lack as to not be capable of good action. The notion of 
true opinion answers the question implicitly raised by Phaedrus: exactly 
how does love enable the lover to act courageously if he/ she is not 
innately courageous? Love provides true opinion of the virtue, which, as 
Socrates says in the Meno, is as good a guide and leader as is lmowledge. 
This notion of love as a leader was also raised by Aristophanes who said, 
... we ought all to exhort others to a pious observance of the gods 
in all things, so that we may escape harm and attain to bliss under 
the gaJJant leadership of Love. Let none in act oppose him - and it 
is opposing him to incur the hate of heaven. 1~ 
Note how Aristophanes emphasizes that no one should oppose love •m 
act", again focusing on the importance of proper conduct specifically in 
l:z:l Ibid., 202b. 
·~Ibid., 193a-b. 
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relation to piety, another notion which makes dialectical ground in 
Socrates' speech as we shall see. We now have the function of love in the 
dialectical context according to which its role as a leader, leading one to 
virtuous conduct, can be properly understood. 
Not only is love an intermediary between the beautiful and the 
ugly, and the good and the bad, as Diotima has just argued, but further, 
it is an intennediary between humanity and divinity. Looking over the 
theological tension mentioned above, Diotima argues that because love 
lacks the beautiful and the good, love cannot be a god, for she and 
Socrates agree that • ... all gods are happy and beautifu1.•124 Socrates 
fails to understand from what has gone before what love is if not a· god. 
Just as he thought love must be ugly if not beautiful, he supposes love to 
be mortal if not divine. Diotima again says that love is •... between a 
mortal and an immorta1.•125 Phaedrus was the first to place love between 
these two poles, whereby love causes one to sacrifice his/her own life 
only to receive immortality because of that selfless action. Here, in 
Diotima's speech, love dwells dialectically between immortality and 
mortality on two levels: first, love's nature is such that it is neither a god 
nor a mortal, and secondly (and perhaps as a result), as we have been 
told by Agathon, love resides or dwells between the two. Diotima brings 
1~4IbitL: 202c. 
1:zs Ibid., 202e. 
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these notions of love together in the one idea, claiming that love is •a 
great spirit . . . for the whole of the spiritual is between divine and 
mortaJ.•l26 We often use the word 'spirit' to denote an emotional drive or 
resolution, i.e., to efforts that are encompassed by, or at least related to, 
the idea of emotional desire. Thus, 'Love the being' and 'love the emotion' 
are both united in the notion of spirit. 
At Socrates' request, Diotima continues to explain the •power" that 
love has as a •great spirit'. She claims that love has the status of a 
messenger between humanity and divinity. Love bridges the gap between 
men and the gods, thus allowing for communion between them. Diotima 
says, 
God with man does not mingle: but the spiritual is the means of all 
society and converse of men with gods and of gods with men, 
whether waking or asleep.127 
Note that the gap requires a bridge for each to reach the other; the divine 
needs communion with humanity just as much as humanity needs 
communion with the divine. 'Ibis reminds us of Aristophanes' rhetorical 
claim that the gods need •... the honours and observances they [have) 
from men.•la A dialectical argument stating why the gods need men is 
1:. Ibid. Lamb teOs us on p. 179 n. 1, •4c.lq.«)w:~ [sicJ [•spirits, and ro 6aqiDIIIDv [sicl 
(literaOy, •a thing having to do with a spiri~, or •a spiritual ~ repreaent tbe 
mysterious qencies and influencea by which the gods communicate with mortals.• 
127 ll1itL t 203a. 
1281bid., 190c. 
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not explicit in the Symposium.. Perhaps further examination of Socrates' 
conduct with Alcibiades will shed light on this matter, for the question of 
what it is that the gods could obtain from men is akin to the question of 
what the lover, i.e., the possessor of wisdom, obtains from his exchange 
with the beloved. In such an inquiry we must remember that selflessness 
figures prominently in the conduct of the lover. We shall examine this 
more fully in Chapter 3. 
Returning to love's function, although Diotima makes great 
dialectical advancement in her exchange with Socrates, she is often 
rhetorical herself in describing the function of love, which she describes 
as, 
Interpreting and transporting human things to the gods and divine 
things to men; entreaties and sacrifices from below, and 
ordinances and requitals from above; being midway between, it 
makes each to supplement the other, so that the whole is 
combined into one.129 
Again, we have the implicit claim that the gods do indeed lack something. 
Perhaps this is not so much an oversight on Plato's part as the 
scholarship claims. Perhaps the gods are lacking and require something 
from men. We must remember that Diotima's speech is a combination of 
dialectic and rhetoric. We do have some questioning and answering, the 
method Socrates applies in the other dialogues; however, there are 
1~ Ibid.. 202e-203a. 
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lengthy sections of somewhat rhetorical discourse. In a sense, the style 
fits well with that of the rest of the Symposium, and putting these words 
into the mouth of Diotima rather than Socrates himself seems to allow 
Plato to use a more rhetorical air in his description of love's nature and 
function. However, the style ofDiotima is much more dialectical that that 
of the speakers before Socrates, in that she employs the method of 
'question and answer' with regard to the nature and function of love, 
thus gaining ground in defining the subject. In Socrates' speech the 
reader is often unaware how rhetoric passes into dialectic and dialectic 
into rhetoric. If we took Mitchell's claim, quoted at the beginning of 
Chapter 1, seriously, then there should be nothing new in Diotima's 
speech. Yet, the speech of Diotima dialectically grounds that which has 
already gone before, and in this it is profoundly original. 
What we have here dialectically in Diotima's description of the 
function of love as a spirit, is the claim that love binds together what are 
separate, thus giving rise to a kind of completion, i.e., • ... that the whole 
is combined into one.•130 Again, we should not be surprised if these 
notions sound familiar. This claim that love binds humanity and divinity 
reminds us of Aristophanes' claim that love is the desire for completion. 
We are also reminded of Eryximachus who cited the importance of the 
130 Ibid. 
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task of the diviner who cultivates the love between god and men, and 
thus, functions like the messenger to whom Diotima likens love. 
Furthennore, Eryximachus explicitly raised the notions of piety and 
divination, and in fact, he was more explicit, (yet more rhetorical in that 
love's nature had yet to be dialectically defined) than Diotima in his 
discussion of piety in relation to the communion that love brings about. 
Diotima seems to restrict matters of communion between men and 
the gods, i.e., spirituality, exclusively to the diviner. Other matters she 
groups together, and implies that they are inferior. She says, -rhrough 
[love's power) are conveyed all divination and priestcraft concerning 
sacrifice and ritual and incantations, and all soothsaying and sorceey.•l31 
Diotima continues, •sldll in this area is what makes a person spiritual, 
whereas skill in any other art or craft ties a person to the material 
world.•132 Love is the power through which salvation is attained, yet 
Diotima claims that only the priest or diviner can utilize this power. 
Eryximachus, however, tells us that the observance and cultivation of 
the proper love, which exists everywhere, is in fact piety itself. He focuses 
on the diviner as he who specifically deals with the attractions between 
men and the gods, but universalizes love's power, claim;ng that it exists 
everywhere. He has said, -ntus Love, conceived as a single whole, exerts 
131 Ibid., 202e-203a. 
132 Ibid., 203a. 
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a wide, a strong, nay, in short, a complete power ... "133 1bus, as I have 
argued in Chapter 1, wherever this love is cultivated, whether it is 
through the skill of the physician, the artist, as well as the priest, as long 
as it is the correct love giving rise to a proper, healthy state, humanity 
and divinity are brought together. Thus, any practitioner of any art or 
techne who performs his/her craft correctly achieves salvation through 
his/her own craft. Diotima says that any other craft besides that of the 
priest or diviner •ties" its practitioner to the material world. It is not clear 
exactly what she means by that, but it seems to imply that these other 
crafts not only fail to achieve communion with the gods, but further, 
actually distract their practitioners from attaining communion with 
them. Placed alongside divination, other skills are seen in a negative 
light. In this sense therefore, Eryximachus, while failing to defme love, 
surpasses Diotima on this matter. 
Love's nature as an intermediary, though present rhetorically since 
the beginning of the dialogue, now has achieved its dialectical context. 
Again, however, Diotima's speech takes a rhetorical turn. After providing 
us with the above dialectical arguments, she tells Socrates a rhetorical 
myth regarding the birth of love, again serving the purpose of showing 
how love is placed between mortality and divinity, want and abundance, 
133 Ibid., 188d. 
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ignorance and lmowledge. Love, Diotima says, is the son of Resource and 
Poverty, and accordingly, has characteristics of both. Her description of 
love in this short myth rivals the rhetoric of all those before her. Because 
Love was conceived on the day of Aphrodite's birth, Diotima claims that 
he is • ... by nature, a lover bent on beauty since Aphrodite is 
beautifu1.•134 'lbe dialectic has grounded what love is, but now, in this 
description of it, the dialectical method gets pushed to one side: 
By birth neither immortal nor mortal, in the selfsame day he is 
flourishing and alive at the hour when he is abounding in 
resource; at another he is dying, and then reviving again by the 
force of his father's nature: yet the resources that he gets will ever 
be ebbing away; so that Love is at no time either resourseless or 
wealthy, and furthennore, he stands midway betwixt wisdom and 
ignorance. 135 
Again, we have the claims that love is akin to true opinion, between 
wisdom and ignorance, and that it is neither mortal not immortal. 
Mitchell finds fault with this rhetorical myth of the birth of eros. He 
writes, -rhe root problem that stems from Eros' inheritance is that he 
must combine in one nature both the mortality of his human mother and 
the immortality of his divine father.• 136 However, Diotima tries to 
understand love's nature taking into account both divine and mortal 
characteristics; we lmow from her dialectical arguments that love is in 
134Jbid., 203c. 
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between humanity and divinity. It is not a •problem• that love's nature is 
such; on the contrary, it is only because love's nature is in between 
humanity and divinity that his nature can combine both and that 
humanity can attain salvation. The function of the myth is to give some 
insight into the intermediate nature of love, not necessarily how it got 
that nature. It is a useful means to explain such difficult and complex 
notions despite its dialectical deficiency, namely that it employs 
analogies rather than reason to make the nature of a thing lmown. 
Diotima's myth regarding the birth of love also gives us an account 
of the origin of the dynamic according to which it is possible for love to 
carry humanity toward divinity, i.e., love's power. In virtue of love's 
possession of true opinion, it is possible for love to recognize its 
ignorance, i.e., its lack of knowledge. Yet because it has not a complete 
deficiency, it is therefore able to undertake the move toward lmowledge. 
The deficiency gives the movement purpose, yet the possession makes 
the dynamic inquiry possible. Because love is •... betwixt wisdom and 
ignorance•, it can desire wisdom. Diotima claims, 
... no gods ensue wisdom or desire to be made wise; such they are 
already; nor does anyone else that is wise ensue it. Neither do the 
ignorant ensue wisdom, nor desire to be made wise: in this very 
point is ignorance distressing, that a person who is not enlightened 
or intelligent should be satisfied with himself. 'lbe man who does 
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not feel himself defective has no desire for that whereof he feels no 
defect. 137 
Accordingly, if neither the wise nor the ignorant pursue wisdom, then 
again, the only people who pursue it must be somewhere between 
wisdom and ignorance. True opinion emerges as the starting point of 
lmowledge and wisdom. Socrates deals with this problem in the Meno in 
what is known as 'Meno's paradox'. Socrates fonnulates the paradox in 
this way: 
... a man cannot try to discover either what he lmows or what he 
does not know ... He would not seek for what he knows, for since 
he lmows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not 
know, for in that case he does not even know what he is to look 
for. 138 
Meno himself adds a second complication to the second part of the 
paradox as presented by Socrates. Even if one could begin the search for 
what one does not lmow, he could never find what it is he is looking for, 
for even if he came •right up against it", he would not be able to 
recognize it as the object of inquiry without somehow already lmowing it. 
Socrates goes further in his formulation, in that one could not even begin 
such an inquiry without first in some sense lmowing what it is that he 
wishes to find. 'lbe doctrine of anamnesis is exgm;ned in the Meno as a 
solution to the paradox, but its details cannot concem us here. In the 
l37 Plato, Sympo.siunt, 203e-204a. 
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Symposium, however, the notion of true opinion appears as a condition 
by which the search for wisdom might be begun. True opinion is the 
middle ground whereby there is both a lack which gives the inquiry 
purpose and a possession which makes the inquiry possible. One must 
be in this middle ground if he/ she is to desire wisdom at all. Only the 
philosopher, i.e., the lover of wisdom, can desire wisdom. He/she is in 
this position of recognition ofhisfher own ignorance. Mitchell writes, 
Eros, then, is a philosopher. He is a lover of wisdom. He desires it. 
He does not have it. He must ceaselessly seek to get hold of what 
he already has, never either really having it or not having it. He is a 
daimon. 139 
Furthermore, it is the power or love which provides us with this 
true opinion, thus intimately uniting love to wisdom in an anagogical 
way. Diotima claims, • ... Love must needs be a friend of wisdom ... • 140 We 
have help in the Symposium through the salvific power or love as it 
grants true opinion to humanity; whereas in the Meno, alllmowledge is 
eternally possessed, yet must be recollected. Therefore, Plato proposes 
another solution to Meno's paradox in the Symposium. True opinion is 
the condition by which wisdom is desired; for neither the wise nor the 
ignorant desire wisdom; and this true opinion, as has been continually 
139 Mitcbell. p. 127. 
140 Plato, Symposium, 204b. 
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claimed since the speech of Phaedrus, is provided by love. Whereas 
Phaedrus presents this dynamic in relation to courage, and Eryximachus 
and Aristophanes present it in tenns of piety, in the speech of Socrates, 
love is the dynamic which carries one toward wisdom. Wisdom is the 
most beautiful of things, according to Diotima, and love, as Agathon 
rhetorically told us, loves only the beautiful. It is the nature of love to be 
attracted to the beautiful, not only in body, but most importantly in 
mind/ soul. There is no such analogous dynamic in the Meno, nor do we 
have one explicitly in the Republic. Love, as a spirit in the Symposium, is 
a kind of grace humanity is given, a helping hand which attracts us 
toward god and god toward us. We shall briefly examine the relation 
between the Symposium and the Republic later in the next section. 
This notion that neither the wise nor the ignorant pursue wisdom 
confuses the relation between the ttaditional lover and the beloved, a 
relation which has been confused from the start. Diotima says that 
Socrates, like many others, believed the beloved to be more akin to love 
since he possesses physical beauty. He supposed that love must too be 
beautiful as the beloved is beautiful. However, according to Diotima's 
arguments, love is not beautiful; it is more akin to the lover who himself 
is not beautiful. The lover is an embodiment of love, acting as the 
mediator, insofar as he tries to attract the beloved toward virtue. Virtue 
is the loveable object, and is, as Diotima says, • ... tnlly beautiful, tender, 
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perfect, and heaven-blest ...• 141 Like love itself, the lover does not possess 
this wisdom, but rather, he possesses true opinion of the beautiful and 
the good. 'nlus, the lover can desire wisdom insofar as he has both a 
possession and a lack as described above. 'Ibis matter is taken up in 
Chapter 3 in the discussion of Alcibiades' speech where Socrates himself 
is seen as the embodiment of love. 'nle lover tries to instill his own desire 
for wisdom in the beloved. Thus, although the lover has no wisdom to 
gain from the beloved, since the beloved does not possess wisdom, in the 
lover's cultivation and production of this proper love in the beloved, · 
teaching him to desire virtue, the lover improves his own piety and that 
of the beloved. For as Eryximachus says, the gods love this love, and 
thus the production and cultivation of this love contributes to both the 
lover's and the beloved's salvation. 
Now that Diotima has revealed to a certain extent the nature of 
love, she moves to explain, as a response to Socrates' question, • ... what 
... [do) we humans gain from [love]?', the true object of love and the 
progression of the soul toward that object. As I have said above, the 
discussions of love's nature and love's function overlap, and we have 
already discussed what love's nature is. Furthermore, the object of love 
itself seems to develop throughout Diotima's speech: love of wisdom 
14llbid., 204c. 
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moves to love of beauty to love of happiness to the love of immortality, all 
of which are encompassed in the ultimate universal desire - the love of 
the good. 
91 
2. 3 SOCRATES AND DIOTIMA (What Love Does) 
The beginning of this second part of Diotima's speech shifts back 
to the dialectical method of question and answer, where Socrates plays 
the part of the interlocutor. First, she questions Socrates as to what 
desire is for on the most basic level, i.e., what desire in general 
analytically entails regardless of its particular object. Perhaps this is a 
basic or presupposed point, but an important one which has yet to be 
explicitly raised. When Diotima asks, •ean you tell me in what sense 
Love loves attractive things?, or more clearly, a lover loves attractive 
things - but why?', Socrates responds, •Because he wants them to be 
his.•142 Love again emerges explicitly as desire for possession, established 
here in a dialectical context. Whatever it is that one desires, he/she 
desires to possess it in some way. This, however, entails another 
question, namely: •What will a person gain if he gets these attractive 
things?"143 When Socrates is unable to answer, Diotima asks the same 
question regarding good rather than beautiful things, moving from 
particular to universal. Socrates quickly answers that one who possesses 
good things will be happy. Happiness, Diotima claims, is an end in itself: 
1421bid., 204d. 
143 Ibid. 
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... [T)he happy are happy by acquisition of good things, and we 
have no more need to ask for what end a man wished to be happy, 
when such is his wish: the answer seems to be ultimate.144 
This desire for happiness is universal. Everyone, as Socrates himself 
often claims, desires the good and thus desires to be happy. However, 
one can be mistaken as to what the good is, and thus might be mistaken 
as to what might make him/her happy, a point Socrates makes in the 
Republic. Regardless of whether one desires completion, a healthy bodily 
state, the cultivation of a student, or the satisfaction of self-sacrifice for 
another's happiness, the happiness of the lover seems to be the ultimate 
goal. I shall stress again that this is not a selfish motive, as one's 
happiness according to virtue necessarily entails the happiness of others. 
This idea develops further into the dialogue, however. Cobb says that 
•[t]his notion that love is basically a desire to possess beautiful things 
will later be rejected as an inadequate view.•145 Although Diotima's focus 
shifts from this desire as the object of love, as Socrates recounts in a 
number of different conversations at difl"erent times, the notion is not 
rejected. Rather, this notion that love is the desire to possess x, becomes 
subsumed under what surfaces as a universal desire for the good, as we 
shall see. Wisdom, beauty, and happiness, are all desired for their 
goodness. 1be good is the ultimate object of desire. 
144 Ibid., 205&. 
145 Cobb, p. 74. 
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Although there are lovers of many different things, be it money, 
music, wisdom, and so on, each lover considers the object of his/her 
desire to be good and thus expects to become happy by the acquisition of 
this object only insofar as it is good. Diotima claims, •Generically, 
indeed, (love] is all that desire of good things and of being happy. •146 She 
says that this desire for the good outweighs any other desire, 
(f)or men are prepared to have their own feet and hands cut off if 
they feel these belongings to be hannful. 'lbe fact is . . . that each 
person does not cherish his belongings except where a man calls 
the good his own property and the bad another's; since what men 
love is simply and solely the gooct.l47 
Diotima makes an explicit reference to the speech of Aristophanes. She 
says, • ... there runs a story ... that all who go seeking their other half are 
in love; though by my account love is neither for half nor for whole, 
unless, of course . . . this happens to be something good. •148 Thus, the 
desire for another person is the same as the desire for anything else in 
that it is the good which is ultimately desired in each pursuit. 'lbus, 
Diotima universalizes the object of desire as the eternal good. Whatever 
one desires, he/she desires it because it is good. 'lhus, Diotima 
concludes that • ... we may state unreservedly that men love the gooct.•149 
146 Sympl8ium, 205c. 
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The object of desire now has its trUe dialectical form. It has moved 
beyond particular bodies and ideas such that the universal object of love 
is now the universal good, which has many different physical and 
metaphysical manifestations. However, to encompass within our 
definition of love those who desire to possess those now present things 
into the future, we must add the temporal aspect to this definition. For 
not only does one wish to possess the good for a certain amount of time, 
but he/she wishes to possess it forever. Thus, Diotima claims, • ... love 
loves the good to be one's own forever. •lSO Just as the doctrine of the 
immortality of the soul is necessary in the Phaedo for the theory of 
anamnesis, so too is the doctrine of the immortality of the soul necessary 
for the definition of love. 
We might remember that eternal immutability had been introduced 
as an essential quality of the object of love by Pausanias. If love is to last, 
he says, then the object of that love must last as well. Thus, he contrasts 
the love of bodies, i.e., objects that change and pass away, with the love 
of eternal things such as virtue and the soul. Eternal objects, such as 
virtue and the soul, are the proper objects of love. Therefore, if the object 
of love is unchanging and eternal, then, and only then, is it possible for 
the love of that object to be eternal. The lover of an eternal object too, 
150 Ibit:L. 
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Pausanias implies, becomes immortal insofar as the object of his/her 
love is immortal: •... the lover whose heart is touched by moral beauties 
is constant all his life, for he has become one with what will never 
fade.•151 If the lover becomes one with the object of love that never fades, 
so too should the lover him/herself never fade insofar as he/she becomes 
one with this eternal object. How, then, does one become one with the 
eternal object of desire and how does one go about attaining this end? 
The speakers previous to Diotima, especially Pausanias and 
Aristophanes, point to wholeness and completion as the end of love. This 
eternal holistic view takes a different form in Diotima's speech, where her 
view of eternity is an endless time, the form that her idea of human 
immortality takes. Diotima now turns to this question of how immortality 
is attained, for it is a necessary condition for the attainment of the true 
object of love. 
Diotima proposes two ways in which immortality might be 
achieved. Not only is immortality presented as necessary if one is 
eternally to possess the good, but furthermore, immortality itself is 
essentially related to happiness, and thus, is itself an object of love 
providing happiness. Immortality, Diotima claims, is achieved by • .•. 
physical and mental procreation in an attractive medium.•u;~ 'Ibis, she 
151 Ibid., ISla. 
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says, is •Love's purpose• .153 According to her rhetorical argument (this is 
not dialectically established, i.e., by rational discussion, yet is 
rhetorically derived from the dialectically grounded nature of love), both 
men and women are pregnant both in body and in soul and desire to 
produce offspring of each. Beauty is essential according to Diotima, for 
begetting occurs only between beautiful bodies and beautiful minds. One 
wonders, however, whether the beauty of body is required for progression 
of the soul and vice versa. Apparently, one is not required for the other, 
for while Socrates is always described as lacking physical beauty, his 
mind is beautifully superior to all those with whom he comes into 
contact. 
Diotima says, explaining this dual pregnancy, •tt is a divine affair, 
this engendering and bringing to birth, and immortal element in the 
creature that is mortal; and it cannot occur where there is 
incompatibility.•154 The beautiful is the eternal in humanity; all else both 
in body and in soul is in constant flux according to Diotima. The body 
grows old: skin, hair, nails, etc., are replaced; it is a wonder that one can 
call an eighty year old man the same person as the baby he once was, for 
it seems that nothing remains unchanged. Diotima claims that this is 
also true of the mind/ soul for •... we find . .. none of [one's] manners or 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., 206c. 
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habits, his opinions, desires, pleasures, pains or fears, ever abiding the 
same in his particular self; some things grow in him, while others 
perish.•155 Knowledge too is forgotten, added to, or corrected. Thus 
Diotima concludes, 
Every mortal thing is preserved in this way; not by keeping it 
exactly the same forever, like the divine, but by replacing what 
goes off or is antiquated with something fresh, in the semblance of 
the original. 156 
Immortality can be achieved only through this mechanism of 
replacement. • ... [T)he mortal nature ever seeks, as best it can, to be 
immortal. In one way only can it succeed, and that is by generation; 
since so it can always leave behind it a new creature (be it physical or 
spiritual] in place of the old.•157 Only in this way, says Diotima, can a 
mortal partake of immortality both in body and in soul. She will, 
however, propose another way in which a greater immortality might be 
attained later in the speech. 
Diotima now takes back what she said earlier of love, i.e., that love 
loves the beautiful. She explicitly tells Socrates that he is wrong in 
supposing that love is of the beautiful (an odd thing for her to say in as 
much as she herself maintained this in her argument up to this point). If 
1ss Ibid., 207e. 
156 /bid., 208b. 
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98 
love is not of the beautiful, then there is no reason to say that love is not 
itself beautiful; for the conclusion that love itself is not beautiful was 
based on the idea that love desires only that which it lacks. If love no 
longer loves the beautiful, then perhaps it is beautiful itself. Diotima 
thus proposes a new definition of the object of love, i.e., • ... engendering 
and begetting upon the beautifu1.•158 Ultimately, however, love desires 
immortality, and thus this desire for begetting upon the beautiful both in 
body and in soul seems to serve only this purpose. Both Love the spirit 
and humanity lack immortality and thus they both love it. Although 
Socrates seems to be recounting a number of separate conversations he 
has had with Diotima, ultimately these conversations unite in that the 
love of the beautiful is being transformed into love of immortality as a 
necessary condition for achieving what has already been given as the 
ultimate object of love- the good. In her presentation, the good is the 
ultimate object of desire, for it is the good, no matter what its 
manifestation, that provides happiness. Whether it be the desire for the 
beautiful or the desire for immortality, the desire for the good is behind 
each of these. The good supplants the beautiful and grounds it. It seems 
that the focus is on immortality here because Diotima is explaining how 
we might attain the good, according to which, immortality is necessary. 
158Ibitl, 206e. 
99 
The way in which humanity can achieve immortality, and the 
immortality it achieves, are both different from those of the divine. 
Human beings replace their bodies and souls throughout life, whereas 
the divine body and soul are complete. We are reminded of Aristophanes' 
claim that love desires completion, for both Diotima and Aristophanes 
present the notion of generation or procreation as ways in which human 
beings come together and achieve the completion that is possible for 
mortals. Each speaker implies that this form of immortality is deficient or 
lacking. Divine completion is not achieved through generation, for its 
completion is eternally constant, whereas the mortal continues through 
endless time, constantly changing throughout. The divine is eternally 
unchanging and complete, whereas the mortal is sempiternal and 
mutable and always incomplete. Without immortality, the ultimate object 
of desire cannot be attained. For not only does love love the good to be its 
own, but further, it loves the good to be its own forever. Thus, 
immortality is necessary, but not sufficient, for the attainment of love's 
ultimate end, i.e., the eternal possession of the good. Diotima says, 
From what has been admitted, we needs rnust yearn for 
immortality no less than for good, since love loves good to be one's 
own forever. And hence it necessarily follows that love is of 
. rtality 159 tmmO . 
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Diotima takes another step back from the previous speeches, 
again, thus suggesting that the reader should be critical in accepting 
what Diotima, as one who uses rhetoric, says. I have argued in Chapter 
1, against Rosen, that one of the great achievements of Phaedrus' 
speech, through his use of examples, is to tie selflessness to love. 
Diotima, however, subverts these examples in an attempt to strengthen 
her claim that all people are obsessed with achieving fame for all time. 
Indeed this is another way in which immortality might be attained by 
mortals; yet it is an inferior type of immortality. Like honour, fame is 
always externally dependant, requiring others to bestow it upon one. 
Diotima degrades the ultimate actions of self-sacrifice performed by 
Alcestis and Achilles. She asks Socrates, 
Do you suppose . . . that Alcestis would have died for Admetus, or 
Achilles have sought death on the corpse of Patroclus ... if they 
had not expected to win 'a deathless memory for valour' which now 
we keep? Of course not. I hold it is for immortal distinction and for 
such illustrious renown as this that they all do all they can, and so 
much the more in proportion to their excellence. 160 
Holding that one never acts selfiessly seems to be a pessimistic outlook 
on the nature of the human condition. It is a step back from Phaedrus to 
160 lbid.. 208e. 
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think that one always has an ulterior motive of self-gain, without which 
no one would act on behalf of anyone. Certainly Phaedrus does not 
present the actions of these figures in such a light, which is cynical 
regardless of whether or not •they are in love with what is immortal. •161 
Getting back to this notion of the begetting of the body and soul, 
Diotima says that the begetting of the soul is of a higher quality than 
that of the body. Plato's mind/body dualism, as we have seen, continues 
into this doctrine of love too, as it does into much of his other work (yet 
we note the tension where present). The soul is given pride of place over 
the body, and thus the begotten of the soul is greater, or more divine, 
than the begotten of the body. This dualism is not explicitly overcome in 
Plato, and although there are implicit notions of equality of body and 
soul in this and some of his other works, e.g., the Phaedrus and Phaedo, 
explicitly, the body is a corruptible prison which must be overcome by 
the soul. Perhaps this is why the idealized lover/beloved relationship is 
more often than not explicitly favoured over heterosexual relationships in 
the dialogue. The mind/body dualism keeps hanging on, rendering 
161 Ibid., 208e. 'Ibis retreat from what has gone befOre, and other retreats like it, are all 
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relationships based solely on the soul greater than those that have 
physical elements, when there is no real dialectical reason for one to be 
greater than the other. We saw this in Aristophanes' speech where 
dialectically, if anything, the heterosexual relationship should be 
favoured in that it begets children; yet Aristophanes favours the 
traditional lover /beloved relationship almost by default. Furthennore, 
while Diotima will favour the traditional male lover /beloved relationship 
to heterosexual relationships, it is ironic that the possibility that females 
too might beget children of the soul is not raised in as much as Diotima, 
a female, is the one who lmows about love. From a universal standpoint, 
a flaw of the dialogue is that it fails to incorporate explicitly what is said 
of this traditional male relationship concerning love into relationships 
involving females, both heterosexual and homosexual. Thus, the places 
where such equality is implicit are important, e.g., Eryximachus' claim 
that love has a universal and complete power over all things. Let us now 
look at what Diotima says about these two types of begetting. 
As for those who are pregnant of body, •... by begetting children 
they acquire a kind of immortality, a memorial, a state of bliss, which in 
their imagining they 'for all succeeding time procure.' •162 
Those who are mentally pregnant, however .. . I mean, there are 
people whose minds are far more pregnant than their bodies; 
162Jbid. 
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they're filled with the offspring you might expect a mind to bear 
and produce ... [, i.e.,) [v)irtue, and especially wisdom.t63 
The anagogical ascent is an ascent of the soul, exclusive of the body. It is 
the soul that is saved, not the body. The teacher of virtue is required to 
give birth to the dialectical children of the soul. These children are given 
pride of place over the children of the body in that they are 'more' 
immortal, so to speak. In fact, in the Theaetetus Socrates refers to 
himself as a midwife who helps men deliver ideas, yet cannot himself give 
birth, for like love, he lacks wisdom.164 Diotima says that lovers who 
mingle psychically 
. . . enjoy a far fuller community with each other than that which 
comes with children, and a far surer friendship, since these 
children of their union are fairer and more deathless. Everyone 
would choose to have children such as these rather than the 
human sort ... 165 
Another translation interprets, 
... and so the bond between them will be more binding, and their 
communion even more complete, than that which comes of 
163Jbid., 208e-209a. 
164 Plato, 771ea.etetu.s, 149-151. •My art of midwifery ia in general like theirs; the only 
difference ia that my patients are men, not women, and my concem ia not with the body 
but with the a:JU1 tbat ia in travail of birth. And the bigheat point of my art ia the power 
to prove by eveey teat whether the otrapring of a young man's thought ia a false 
phantom or instinct with life and truth. I am ao far like the miclwii: that I cannot myself 
giw birth to wiadom, and the oommon reproach is true, that, though I question others, 
I can myaelfbrin@ nothing to light becauae there ia not wiedom in me.• (150b--c). 
165Jbid., 209c-d. 
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bringing children up, because they have created something lovelier 
and less mortal than human seed.166 
The procreation earlier discussed by Aristophanes here takes on new 
meaning. Aristophanes mentions physical • conception and 
continuation of their (physical) kind ... ", thus anticipating this notion of 
succession giving rise to the kind of immortality now made explicit by 
Diotima. Diotima introduces this new dialectical notion of psychical 
conception and continuation, which gives rise to a higher immortality. 
This notion of immortality is immensely difficult to grasp, as Diotima 
warns, yet she proceeds with the teaching. 
Diotima presents this anagogical progression of the soul in the 
image of the ladder, each rung of which represents a movement toward 
the idea of the beautiful. Diotima's ladder is akin to Socrates' line and 
cave analogies in the Republic. Although we shall look briefly at these 
below, I must note here that Diotima has presented the good as the 
universal object of desire, and it is the good that resides at the top of the 
line and outside of the cave. Diotima, however, particularizes her image 
of the ladder in terms of beauty. The relationship between love and 
beauty is unclear in Plato. In the Philebus, he presents the good in a 
166 Plato, •Symposium. • Platg: the CoJlectcd Qialogues Including tbc lettc"· Trans. R. 
Hackfortb. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. (Princeton, New Jeraey: 
Princeton UP, 1989), 209 ced. ('lbe previous quotation is from Lamb's translation.) 
Socrates eays mo~e about the ctiaJectica1 eeed in the Phllednls 276e-277a. We shall 
examine tbis pa p in relation to the education of the beloved in Chapter 3. 
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trinitarian structure, of which beauty is a member. 167 The details need 
not concern us here beyond the fact that the ladder is particularized in 
terms of beauty; yet we lmow, as Diotima has explicitly told us, that the 
good is the ultimate object of desire. 
The progression of the soul, particularized as the progression of 
the mind toward the idea of the beautiful, begins with the love of one 
particular, physically beautiful body. As with Plato's line analogy, we 
begin with the particular physical manifestation, i.e., an image of beauty. 
Again, as with Plato's line, we move from the particular to the universal, 
and here with Diotima's ladder, the universalization first takes place 
within the physical. Diotima says, 
.. . next he must remark how the beauty attached to this or that is 
cognate to that which is attached to any other, and that if he 
means to ensue beauty in its form, it is gross folly not to regard as 
one and the same the beauty belonging to all ... 168 
The notion of the •ronn• of beauty is mentioned here. The student begins 
to realize that it is the same beauty which makes all beautiful objects 
beautiful. After this point, the main division of the line is crossed in that 
from here, the • ... next advance will be to set a higher value on the 
beauty of souls than on that of the body ... •l69 Here, we are reminded of 
167 -rhen if \Ve C&Dilot hunt clown the good under a single form, let us aecure it by the 
conjunction of three, beauty, proportion, and truth, ... • Plato, Phile~ 65. 
161 Plato, Symposir.un, 210b. 
169Jbid. 
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Pausanias who achieved this level of progression himself, emphasizing 
the soul as the proper object of love. The student, like the prisoner 
emerging from the cave, moves beyond the physical world. The next step 
is the universalization of beauty in the metaphysical realm concerning 
the love of beautiful •observances and laws•, perhaps akin to 
mathematics on the line. From there he moves to certain branches of 
lmowledge, which more than likely are knowledge of the virtues170 From 
this point, the soul reaches the highest vision of the idea of beauty itself. 
Diotima describes the form of beauty in language quite similar to 
that which Socrates uses to describe the forms in the Phaedo. 171 
First of all, it is ever-existent and neither comes to be nor perishes, 
neither waxes nor wanes; next, it is not beautiful in part and in 
part ugly, nor is it such at such a time and other at another, nor in 
one respect beautiful and in another ugly, nor so affected by 
position as to seem beautiful to some and ugly to others ... existing 
ever in singularity of form independent by itself, while all the 
multitude of beautiful things partake of it in such wise that, 
though all of them are coming to be and perishing, it grows neither 
greater nor less, and is affected by nothing.ln 
110 Ibid., 210c. 
171 Plato, Phaedo, 78c-79a. •'Does that absolute reality which \Ve define in our 
diacueaions remain always constant and invariable or not? Doea abeolute equality or 
beau1;y or any other independent enti1;y which really exists ever admit chanae of any 
kind? Or does each one ol tbeae uniform and independent entities remain always 
constant and invariable, aever admitting any altaation in any respect or in any aenae?' 
- -rhey must be conetant and invariable. Socratl:a, laid Cebea. • (78c-d) 
112 Symposium, 21la-b. 
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It is interesting to note that the via negitiva in which beauty is described 
places it in direct opposition to the way in which love itself is described, 
for love is all these things, e.g., beautiful in part and in part ugly, etc., 
which beauty itself is not. Love is something separate from, yet 
intimately connected to, beauty /the good itself. Diotima connects this 
perfect vision of beauty to lmowledge of virtue. For when one attains this 
vision and sees •... the heavenly beauty face to face ... • he becomes • ... 
quickened with the true, and not the seeming, virtue- for it is virtue's 
self that quickens him, not virtue's semblance.•173 Diotima presents the 
ascent of the soul as a progression beginning with particular physical 
beauty and moving toward the universal idea of beauty. Waterfield notes 
the need for this ascent to be progressive. 
In Socrates' terms, the desire of a young man had to be aroused, 
even if the young man mistakenly took it at first to be physical, 
because that same desire could enable him to transcend the 
physical and pursue lmowledge.l74 
The attainment of the final vision is the attainment of immortality. 
Diotima says, 
And when he has brought forth and reared this perfect virtue, he 
shall be called the friend of god, and if ever it is given to man to 
put on immortality, it shall be given to him.17S 
173 Ibid., 211e-212a. 
174 Plato, Symposium, Robin Waterfield (trans.) (()d)rd: Qxi)rd UP, 1994), p. xviii. 
175 Plato, Symposium, 212a. 
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This notion of friendship with the gods has been explicitly present since 
the speech of Eryximachus and was further developed by Aristophanes. 
Here, however, we have its ultimate dialectical manifestation in relation 
to conduct. Bloom says, IPfo see and perhaps become one with what is 
always is the philosopher's way of reaching immortality.•l76 In the above 
text, however, the lmowledge of virtue is not enough. The goal is not only, 
as Bloom says, • ... (an] attainable goal as the completion of wisdom, 
which is a full grasp of beauty and immortality", but further, there must 
be conduct related to that wisdom; the perfect virtue must not only be 
•brought forth•, but •rearec~•. 177 The notion of the importance of proper 
conduct in relation to piety permeates the whole dialogue from Phaedrus 
to Alcibiades. Furthermore, Bloom says, 
It is true that the objects of the philosopher's contemplation are 
immortal, but Diotima wishes to make us forget that the 
philosopher is not. She says that the philosopher is immortal if any 
human being is. That is a very big if ... He lmows that he will die, 
and this very contact with the things that are always provides the 
measure of the difference between them and him.178 
We have seen, however, that the immortality of the soul was required if 
the object of love was to be attained, for one desires to possess the good 
176 Bloom, 521. 
177 Ibid. 
171 Ibid., 523. 
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eternally. Although not presented dialectically here in the Symposium, 
Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul is in fact crucial to the 
argument. Diotima was quite clear about the distinction between the 
immortality attained by physical procreation and the immortality 
attained by psychical procreation. The immortality attained by the bearer 
was presented as proportionate to the immortality of the begotten. Thus, 
Diotima leaves this matter open, and in the above text implies that 
another immortality is necessary, hence possible. If we are to see a 
continuity between the Symposium and the Phaedo on this matter, the 
immortality of the soul must be maintained, and Bloom is probably 
incorrect in saying that the philosopher who attains such a vision 
dies.179 'Ibe purpose of the salvific power of love is lost without the 
immortality of the soul. The notion of immortality, rust introduced by 
Phaedrus, has now reached its pinnacle. Love is not merely the desire for 
the eternal possession of the good (which necessarily entails 
immortality), but further, it is that power which enables one to attain it. 
Love carries one up this ladder, binding together man and the divine. 
Rosen is correct in saying that •Eros is not self-sufficient 
although exb emely useful•; however, I believe that he is mistaken in 
saying that • ... pave) is not quite indispensable•. He continues, 
179 'ftte central topic of Plato's Phtledo c:oncema the doctrine of the immortality of the 
aoul. 
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If one tried hard enough, one could apparently find a still better 
assistant. The specific excellence of Eros is as an assistant in the 
attempt to grasp immortality via the perception of beauty. Perhaps 
better assistants are available if one takes a different path.t80 
In light of what Phaedrus says, i.e., that love • ... is the ancient source of 
our highest good ... without which neither cities nor citizens are capable 
of any great or noble work", Eros is certainly indispensable. 181 And if it is 
also true that •Goct with man does not mingle•, then indeed we need 
love's help on our soul's journey.182 
Diotima's ladder in the Symposium is akin to Socrates' line in the 
Republic, as I have argued. Each presents an anagogical progression of 
the soul toward knowledge of the good. Each begins with true opinion, 
which involves both a realization of ignorance and a desire to proceed 
from that ignorance, and also a knowing which is not knowing, i.e., 
correct opinion which cannot account for itself. 183 'lbere are, however, 
interesting differences between the two. 'lbe first, and perhaps most 
apparent difference is that the line deals with the universal as such 
whereas the ladder is the line particularized in terms of beauty. However, 
110 Roeen, pp. 276-7. 
181 Plato, Symposium, 178c-d. 
182 Ibid., 202e. 
113 1be prieoner in the cave wbo makes the philosophical tum ia like the man who 
gueaaes the correct way to Lariaaa in that the prisoner knows there is aomething 
beyond the shadows and images, yet lmowe not what it ia and thua eanmt account for 
the generation or the ahadowa and imqea. 
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I believe that the most important difference between the line and the 
ladder, especially from a theological point of view, is that in the ladder 
there is help throughout this progression. Love, as a most powerful 
spirit, carries one up the ladder; love is the dynamic which in desire 
binds humanity and divinity, aiding the anagogical progression of the 
soul to its end. The Symposium is, in essence, an examination of the 
dynamic of love in relation to its anagogical function. The Symposium is a 
rhetorical and dialectical account of the nature of love and its power to 
aid humanity in its salvation. In this way, the Symposium is not only a 
more elaborate and lengthy, albeit narrowed, account of what appears in 
Book VI of the Republic as the line and cave analogies, but further, it 
provides help in this progression which the Republic explicitly lacks. The 
line and cave surpass the ladder in their universality, whereas the 
ladder, though particularized in terms of beauty, surpasses the line 
dynamically. 
If we read Plato's cave analogy in the Republic carefully enough, 
however, we can see love, as it is rhetorically and dialectically examined 
in the Symposium, at work. Plato's cave analogy takes a dramatic turn 
when the prisoner is released from his bonds. From this point on, he 
seems to be aided by an unknown power. This someone or something is 
not the focus of the cave analogy and is almost overlooked but he/she/it 
is surely there. Someone has to Cree the prisoner, and if he is • ... 
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compelled to stand up, tum his head, walk, and look up toward the light 
... •, he must be compelled to do these things by someone.184 Socrates 
sometimes says that -we•, i.e., the present company, are with the 
prisoner, as though Socrates and his interlocutors are doing this. At 
other times, it is this mysterious and non-particular someone. This 
someone • ... compell[s) him to look at the light itself ... •ISS This someone, 
be it Socrates himself or someone else, seems to be a personification of 
love. Or perhaps, as I believe, it is love itself. Socrates describes this 
person's action in a way similar to his description of love's function in 
the Symposium. In the Republic, this implicit dynamic • ... dragged [the 
prisoner) away . . . by force, up the rough, steep path, and clidn ~ let him 
go until he had dragged him into the sunlight ... •186 
The dynamic is implicit in the Republic, and had one not read the 
Symposium, both the presence of the dynamic itself, and its functional 
significance, might be overlooked completely. The Symposium is an 
identification of that anagogical dynamic and an examination of its 
function, i.e., what it does and how it does it. One might think it 
possible, from a reading of the Republic alone, that such a progression of 
the soul is possible through one's own, unaided power. The Symposium, 
114 Plato, Republic, 515c. 
185 Ibid. J 515d. 
116 Ibid., 515e. 
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however, explicitly introduces the need for such a mediator between god 
and man and tells us how such a mediation works. The mysterious guide 
in the Republic is surely none but love itself, which encompasses and 
acts as a guide for all those who, as Eryximachus tells us, create and 
cultivate this love in others. 'lbe teacher, the physician, the dialectician, 
the poet, etc., as I argue following Eryximachus, insofar as they instill 
and cultivate this proper love are all manifestations of this love, are all 
playing the role of the rescuer and guide in the cave analogy. Although it 
is only implicit in the Republic, the major division of the line, i.e., the exit 
of the cave, is crossed only by the provocation and continued struggle of 
the guide. Help is required to ascend to the good. In a sense, the 
Symposium is an elaboration and rhetorical/ dialectical working out of 
this implied but crucial element of the cave analogy. 
Although we have seen Diotima retreat from several of the 
advances made by some of the previous speakers, e.g., denying the 
selflessness of love maintained by Phaedrus, she grounds the nature of 
love dialectically. The effect of this grounding is that it sets up further 
conditions whereby the definition of the nature and function of love can 
still progress. Tracing the continuity among the speeches up to its 
culmination in that of Socrates is at times difficult, for some speakers do 
not mention at all some of the great advances made by their 
predecessors, while others shrink back from some of these advances. 
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Again, as I say in the Introduction, this is not to say that the speeches 
are self-contained. 'lbe difficult whole-part relation is present both within 
each speech and within the dialogue as a whole of which each speech is 
a part. Once the nature of love is grounded by Diotima, many of the 
rhetorical claims made by the previous speakers not only carry more 
dialectical weight, but the advancement they do make becomes 
grounded, as we have seen. The dialectic is immanent in the rhetoric of 
the first five speeches, and progressively emerges throughout the 
dialogue. 
Not only has the nature of love been dialectically established as a 
most powerful spirit between god and man, but the object of love, i.e., the 
universal good, the necessary condition of which is immortality, has also 
been dialectically grounded. Rosen is certainly correct in saying, 
•Diotima reconciles the human and the divine, and she does so on the 
premises of the previous speakers ... •187 The unity of the dialogue is 
present within the continuity of the notions tackled by each speech. As 
with many of Plato's dialogues, the definitions of the nature and function 
of love are not complete, but the essence is established, by which the 
reader, through continued interaction with the text, is able to further this 
dialectical advancement. The dialectic • ... contain(s) a seed whence new 
117 Rosen, p. 276. 
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words grow up in new characters ... • 188 1be reader of the Symposium, 
however, is given further help in his/her own progression through the 
speech that is rmally to come. In the speech of Alcibiades we shall see the 
proper love at work on two levels. In one sense, we shall see how the 
lover (Socrates) acts toward his beloved (Alcibiades); and insofar as this 
conduct is demonstrated for us we can see love itself working through its 
personification in Socrates. 
118 Plato,~ 277a. 
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CHAPTER 3 - LOVE IS DEMONSTRATED 
3. 1 1HE SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES 
The nature and function of love have both been presented in their 
respective dialectical contexts. Love has been established as the desire 
for the eternal possession or the good, involving physical and psychical 
procreation leading to the salvation of the soul. In the speech of 
Alcibiades, this love is demonstrated by the behaviour of Socrates who 
expresses the two natures or love: love the emotion, and Love the being. 
Socrates is both in love and acts like Love, and his behaviour 
demonstrates his own spirituality and likeness to the daimonic nature of 
love. Socrates, as he himself admits, is in love with Alcibiades.l89 
However, the lover/beloved relationship has come a long way since the 
speech of Phaedrus. What is present in this speech is the fulfillment of 
what had begun to emerge in the speech of Pausanias. We saw 
Pausanias maintaining the Athenian social norm by holding that the 
lover should teach his beloved virtue in exchange for sexual gratification. 
However, Pausanias made the distinction between the wicked and the 
noble lover. 'Ibe noble lover is admirable in that the objects of his desire 
119 .,en Socrates aaidt 'Asa~ do your beat to protect me, for I haft found my lowe 
Cor this fellow no trifling afl'air. • Symposium, 213c. 
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are eternal, e.g., virtue and the soul, while the base lover is disgraceful in 
that the objects of his desire are mutable, e.g., the physical body and 
carnal pleasures. In his failure to let go of the physical act, Pausanias, 
while elevating the beloved in his desire for virtue, debases the lover who 
becomes wicked in his desire for the beloved's body. This tension is 
removed in the speech of Alcibiades wherein Socrates demonstrates the 
proper conduct between lover and beloved according to which the 
physical act is removed. The relationship, as we have seen, has been 
evolving into a teacher-student relationship wherein there is no sexual 
act. 190 Let us now see how Socrates' daimonic behaviour is described by 
his beloved Alcibiades. 
Alcibiades' speech is both different from and like those that have 
gone before it. Unlike the others, which praise love, Alcibiades' speech 
praises Socrates. 'lbus, explicitly, his speech has a clitrerent topic. 
Implicitly, however, the speeches have the same topic, for both Socrates' 
nature and behaviour are akin to those of love, i.e., Socrates is presented 
as the personification of love in Alcibiades' speech. Alcibiades begins by 
saying that he • ... shall speak the truth.• 191 He says to Socrates before he 
190 Becauae or the dialogue's focus on the traditional lover/beloved relationship, along 
with Plato's negative view toward the body, we do not explicitly have a dilc:uuion on the 
ramifications or the doctrine or love as it pertains to lovers who are equal, i.e., a 
lover /lover relationship. While it would aeem that the pbyaical act between equals 
would not be aa problematic, there still pnMii1a the argument that tbe mingling or 
minds between equals yields a greater and more immortal production. 
191 Ibid., 214e. 
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begins, •If I say anything that is false, have the goodness to take me up 
short and say that there I am lying; for I will not lie if I can help it.•l92 
Socrates is silent throughout the speech, so the reader can only suppose 
that what Alcibiades says is true. 
Alcibiades begins by describing Socrates' power over mankind. He 
compares Socrates to the satyrs, particularly Marsyas, saying that he 
both looks like and acts like them. Alcibiades says, •[Marsyas) indeed 
had the power to entrance mankind by means of his instruments ... •193 
He claims that those who can play the melodies of Marsyas on the flute 
possess the power to •excit[e} a ravishment" in others to the present 
day. 194 He says to Socrates, "You differ from him in one point only - that 
you produce the same effect with simple prose unaided by 
instruments.•195 Socrates does not use musical instruments to entrance 
others, yet he does use a kind of instrument. His instrument is the 
dialectical methocl. 196 While Alcibiades attnbutes this power to entrance 
192 Ibid., 214e-215a. 
193Jbid., 215c. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid. 
196 '11lis power Socrates wields is aleo spoken about by Meno in the dialogue bearing his 
name. He aaya, •Socrates, even before I met you they told me that in plain truth you are 
a perplexed man younelf and reduce others to perplexity. At this moment I feel you are 
exercising magic and witchcraft upon me and positively laying me under your apeD until 
I am just a mass of helpleaaneaa. Ill may be Oippant, I think that not only in outward 
appearance but in other JapeCta aa well you are exactly like the Oat atiJllray that one 
meets in the aea. Whenever anyone comes into contact with it, it numbs him, and that 
ia the aort of thing that you aeem to be doing to me now. My mind and my lips are 
literally numb, and I haw nothing to reply to you ••. if you behaw:ci like this aa a 
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to Socrates himself, Socrates separates himself from it. We recall that he 
tells Agathon, • ... it is the truth ... whom you cannot contradict: Socrates 
you easily may.•197 The dialectic is an objective, not subjective, power, 
i.e., its power is independent of the user. Alcibiades illustrates the 
difference between Socrates' use of dialectic and the rhetoric of others, 
thus contrasting between Socrates and the other speakers of the 
Symposium: 
For example, when we hear any other person- quite an excellent 
orator, perhaps - pronouncing one of the usual discourses, no one, 
I venture to say, cares a jot; but so soon as we hear you, or your 
discourses in the mouth of another, - though such person be ever 
so poor a speaker, and whether the hearer be a woman or a man or 
a youngster - we are all astounded and entranced.l98 
Alcibiades illustrates the universal power that the dialectic has over all 
people, regardless of its user. The dialectic is objective in that no matter 
who relates the arguments and no matter who receives them, they are 
universally accessible. What exactly, however, is this power of 
entrancement that Socrates has through his use of the dialectic? 
Socrates' words, though lacking in rhetorical flourish, are more 
powerful and inspirational than those even of Pericles. Alcibiades says, 
•For when I hear him I am worse than any wild fanatic; I find my heart 
foreigner in another country, you would moat likely be arrested as a wizard. • (Plato, 
Meno, 79e-80b). 
197 Plato. Symposium. 20 lc. 
191Jbid.215d. 
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leaping and my tears gushing forth at the sound of his speech, and I see 
great numbers of other people having the same experience. •199 Socrates 
makes people think about virtue, thereby making them question the 
quality of their own lives and conduct. Alcibiades says, 
When I listened to Pericles and other skilled orators I thought them 
eloquent, but I never felt anything like this: my spirit was not left 
in a tumult and had not to complain of my being in the condition 
of a common slave, whereas the influence of our Marsyas here has 
often thrown me into such a state that I thought my life not worth 
living on these tenns. 200 
Alcibiades illustrates Socrates' power as a teacher of virtue. Although 
Socrates not only claims that he is ignorant of what virtue is, but also 
even questions whether or not it is teachable, he has the ability to make 
others question the quality of their own lives. In the Meno, where Meno 
likens Socrates to a sting ray that paralyzes others, Socrates says that 
his ability to do so comes only as a result of his own perplexity. He says, 
As for myself, if the sting ray paralyzes others only through being 
paralyzed itself, then the comparison is just, but not otherwise. It 
isn't that, knowing the answers myself, I perplex other people. The 
truth is rather that I infect them also with the perplexity I feel 
myself.201 
199 Ibid., 215d-e. 
200 lbitL, 215e-216L 
201 Plato. Jleno. 79b-c. 
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As with love, Socrates does not possess wisdom. He does, however, 
possess true opinion and therefore he both realizes his own ignorance 
and is able to undertake the search for wisdom. 
Socrates, through his use of dialectic, has the power, like love 
itself, to move one to virtuous action. He instills true opinion in others, 
making them question the quality of their lives. Once one begins to 
question virtue, and in loving and desiring wisdom becomes a 
philosopher, there is no turning back. Alcibiades says, 
What happens is that although I'm perfectly well aware of the 
inescapable force of his recommendations as to what I should do, 
yet as soon as I'm away from him, I get seduced by the 
adulteration of the masses. So I act like a runaway slave and keep 
away from him, and whenever I do see him, I feel ashamed because 
of the promises I made him. 202 
Although Alcibiades says that it is Socrates who makes him feel shame, 
it is the force of Socrates' arguments, which are independent of Socrates, 
that shame him. Once one reali?.es his/her lack of virtue and 
desires/loves it, the desire must be fulfilled, i.e., we desire completion, as 
Aristophanes says. The shame of Alcibiades is a reflection of the tension 
between proper and improper conduct, ignorance and knowledge, 
mortality and divinity. Shame is felt only when the philosophical tum is 
made, without which tum further ascent is impossible. Love, as both the 
202 Plato, Sympo.sium, 216b. 
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desire for the good and the spirit that elevates, brings one beyond shame 
toward salvation. Socrates uncovers and removes ignorance, thus 
making shame, and subsequently salvation, possible. 
Pausanias has already made the distinction between proper and 
improper objects of desire. Eternal, unchanging objects such as the soul 
and the virtues, etc., he said are worthy of love, while mutable, fleeting 
things such as the youthful body, were said to be unworthy of love: for 
the quality and duration of the love depend upon the quality and 
duration of its object. Pausanias, however, fails to bring this distinction 
to fulfillment in relation to the proper conduct between lover and beloved, 
as we have seen. While the beloved is to be commended on his desire for 
virtue as he seeks it out in a lover, the lover is condemned in his desire 
for the body of the youth. Pausanias' distinction between the proper and 
improper object of love was sound; yet his portrayal of the proper 
conduction between lover and beloved was confused. The true and proper 
object of the love of the lover is not the body, for this would make him 
the lesser of the two. 'lbere is no dialectical need for the physical 
exchange. Rather, Socrates demonstrates the proper conduct between 
lover and beloved, which now comes to fulfillment as a teacher student 
relationship. 'Ibis is demonstrated in his conduct toward Alcibiades. 
Alcibiades speaks of Socrates' indifJerence to physical beauty. He 
says, •1 tell you, all the beauty a man may have is nothing to him; he 
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despises it more than any of you can believe ... •203 '111e object of Socrates' 
desire, as a philosopher, is beyond mere physical beauty. Alcibiades tells 
of how he tried to seduce Socrates, reversing the traditional roles of lover 
and beloved. Socrates, however, on a number of occasions refused his 
advances, thereby demonstrating his control over his passions, i.e., he 
exhibits temperance, which, not incidentally, Agathon had identified as 
love itself. 204 Alcibiades believes himself to have found virtue in Socrates 
and wishes that Socrates teach him in exchange for sexual gratification. 
This is a concrete example of the confused fonnula that Pausanias 
presents for proper conduct in such a relationship. Alcibiades tells 
Socrates, 
I find it sheer folly not to gratify you in this as in any other need 
you may have of either my property or that of my friends. To me 
nothing is more important than the attainment of the highest 
possible excellence, and in this aim I believe I can find no nobler 
ally than you. 205 
Alcibiades' proposal is refused by Socrates on two grounds. First, 
Socrates claims that he has nothing to offer Alcibiades. Socrates was 
different from the sophists of his day in that he accepted no fee for his 
203IIritL, 216d. 
304 While lave ia not identical to temperance, for love ia not a virtue, they certainly have 
much in common aa ~ have aeen. 
205 Ibid., 218. 
124 
teaching, for he believed that he had nothing to teach.206 In Plato's 
dialogues, Socrates does not often present his companions with lengthy 
discourses on subjects, but rather, he asks them questions to which, as 
he claims in the Meno, he himself does not know the answers. Socrates 
speaks at length about his ignorance and reputed wisdom in the 
Apology. Socrates' true wisdom lies in his reaUzation of his own 
ignorance. 'Ibis puts him far ahead of others, about whom he speaks in 
the Apology, and who claim to lmow that which they do not: 
It is only too likely that neither of us has any knowledge to boast 
of, but he thinks that he knows something which he does not 
know, whereas I am quite conscious of my ignorance. At any rate it 
seems that I am wiser than he is to this small extent, that I do not 
think that I know what I do not lmow. 207 
For this reason Socrates refuses Alcibiades' advances: he claims that he 
has no lmowledge of virtue to offer him. The benefit of having Socrates as 
a teacher lies in his ability to reveal one's ignorance, from which alone 
one can begin to move toward wisdom. Also interesting to note in the 
Apology, is Socrates' referral to his habit of argumentation as his 
206 --rile fact is that there ia nothing in any of theae cbargea, and if you have heard 
anyone say that I try to educate people and charge a fee, there is no truth in that either. 
I wish that there were, becauee I think tbat it is a fiDe thing if a man is qualified to 
teach ... • P!atD, Apology 19d-e. Aleo '"31c. 
2frT Ibid., 2ld. 
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"religious duty". 208 He has a duty to reveal ignorance and thus like love, 
unites god and man. For only in recognition of our own ignorance can we 
desire wisdom and virtue and thus begin to remedy that deficiency. 
Before we move to the second reason why Socrates refuses 
Alcibiades' advances, we shall look fU'St at the greater insight we now 
have in relation to the problem raised by Pausanias' presentation of the 
proper objects of love: namely, if the desires of the lover are elevated 
beyond the physical, then what does he/ she receive in his exchange with 
the beloved? 'lbis question can be raised in this context only in terms of 
the traditional lover /beloved relationship, which again, is now a 
teacher I student relationship. Plato does not explicitly discuss the 
ramifications of his theory of love in tenns of lovers who are equal 
physically and psychically, e.g., a lover/lover relationship. Conceivably, 
each would benefit physically and psychically from the other. However, 
the relationship between a man/woman and a youth is different in that 
the youth has no lmowledge of virtUe to give. 209 In addition to the fact 
that love involves self·sacrifice, as Phaedrus has told us, and thereby the 
~ • This duty I have accepted, aa I said, in obedience to God's commands given in 
oraclea and dreams and in every other way that any other divine diapen•tion baa ever 
impresaed a duty upon man. • Apology, 33c. See a1ao Apology, 21e and 35d. 
l09 In fact. Socrates himaelf cJajma to haw no knowled&e to give to otbera, yet one 
benefits from hie dialectical diecuaaion in the realization or hie/her own ignorance and 
ability to move from it towanl knowJed&e. 'lbua, the student's relationship to such a 
penon ia indeed paycbically beneficial. 
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lover need not receive compensation, Eryximachus has done much more 
to solve this problem of inequality for us. 
We recall that god loves the creation and cultivation of the proper 
love wherever it is done. Insofar as one cultivates this love and conducts 
him/herself properly, he/she is pious and achieves immortality. 
Socrates, as a dialectician and teacher, instills in others the desire for 
virtue, thus cultivating the proper love; i.e., he creates and cultivates the 
attraction of people toward worthy objects. Thus, insofar as he reveals 
the ignorance of others and moves them toward virtue, he is pious and 
contributes to his salvation as well as that of the interlocutor(s). In 
Alcibiades' speech we have this doctrine of piety and salvation, 
introducecl by Eryximachus, concretized by Socrates' actions. It is 
important to note as well that Socrates does not speak with others about 
virtue in order to achieve salvation himself. Rather, he sees it as his 
religious duty to do so. He says in the Apology, 
. . . I . . . go about seeking and searching in obedience to the divine 
command, if I think that anyone is wise, whether citizen or 
stranger, and when I think that any person is not wise, I try to 
help the cause of God by proving that he is not. 'Ibis occupation 
has kept me too busy to do much else in politics or in my own 
affairs. In fact, my service to God has reduced me to exb eme 
poverty.210 
210 Ibid., 23b. 
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This is evidence against the claim that Socrates is selfish, using others to 
attain his own salvation. Ruprecht suggests, 
[Perhaps Socrates] uses beauty, drinks it to the dregs, then 
discards it when demands are made of his particular fonn of 
beauty, in tum. Naussbaum accuses him of just this kind of 
hardness - a sort of erotic brittleness and frigidity - and of being a 
heartbreaker to boot. He means to use eros, to get himself where 
he really wants to go, alone - up the divine ladder toward the 
beatific vision of the beautiful. 211 
No view could be further from the truth on this matter. Socrates, as he 
says in the Apology, spent his life making others realize their own 
ignorance on matters of virtue. He instills them with true opinion and 
love of philosophy so that they might ascend the ladder with him. At one 
point in the Apology, Socrates even refers to himself as a •gift of God•, 
again putting him in a direct relation to love itself. 212 Love is indeed a gift 
of God, a spirit of grace which enables man to achieve salvation; and 
Socrates too, insofar as he is a daimonic personification of love, 
possessing true opinion and instilling it in others, leads others toward 
salvation as well. I agree with Waterfield on this matter, who writes, 
It seems likely that Socrates exploited the homoerotic nature of the 
Athenian circle within which he moved for his own ends. If he 
played the lover and pursued young men, he was trying to make 
them consummate a lifelong affair with philosophy, not with 
lll Rupn!dlt, p. 59. 
:l1~ Plato, Apology, 30d-e. 
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himself; he turned the 'patronage' of the lover . . . to educational 
purposes. 213 
Secondly, Socrates refuses the advances of Alcibiades because he 
has no desire for physical bodies. The beauty of the soul by far outshines 
the beauty of the body. Socrates says to Alcibiades, 
... if what you say of me is the actual truth, and there is a certain 
power in me that could help you to be better; . . . then what a 
stupendous beauty you must see in me, vastly superior to your 
comeliness. 214 
Socrates says that in his attempt to exchange his body for that which he 
believes Socrates' soul to possess, Alcibiades is • ... trying to get genuine 
in return for reputed beauties, ... real 'gold for bronze.' •215 Pausanias' 
early distinction between the worthy and the unworthy objects of love is 
here concretized in the actions of Socrates. Socrates resists Alcibiades' 
seduction with contempt. If love is to be eternal and unchanging, so too 
must be its object. Socrates desires the eternal and thus is not in love 
with physical beauty. Therefore, the sexual exchange encouraged by 
Pausanias is severed from the now teacher 1 student relationship. 
Waterfield agrees with this portrayal of Socrates' behaviour: 
:n3 Waterfield, p. xvii. 
214 Plato. Symposium. 218cl-e. 
215 Ibid., 218e-219a. 
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1be master - pupil relationship in philosophical training is erotic 
in that the master embodies the wisdom the pupil desires; but it is 
a mistake to downgrade this eroticism and have sex with your 
teacher. 216 
He continues, 
In all this it is never far from the surface that the Greek word 
philosophia means 'love of wisdom'. For those Greeks who took it 
seriously, philosophy was more than higher education: it was a 
way of life and a means to salvation. It was therefore to be pursued 
passionately, with lifelong devotion ... 211 
The teacher has salvation as the end in mind for both himself and the 
student. Socrates describes this relation in the Phaedrus. He says, 
The dialectician selects the soul of the right type, and in it he 
plants and sows his words founded on lmowledge, words which 
can defend both themselves and him who planted them, words 
which instead of remaining barren contain a seed whence new 
words grow up in new characters, whereby the seed is vouchsafed 
immortality, and its possessor the fullest measure of blessedness 
that man can attain unto. 218 
The progressing notion of the conduct between lover and beloved has 
now reached its dialectical completion. Pausanias' distinction between 
the noble and base objects of love is maintained and developed, while his 
idea of the conduct between lover and beloved has evolved into the 
proper idea of conduct concretized in Socrates' behaviour. 
216 Waterfield, p. xviii. 
217 Ibid. 
21a Plato, PhD«Jrus, 276e-277a. 
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This •lofty disdain• Socrates has for the physical is further 
illustrated by Alcibiades in his account of Socrates' heroic actions in the 
Athenian military.219 Socrates' super-human ability to transcend his 
physical body is often presented in contrast to others' attachment to 
their bodies. Socrates is able to drink to great extents and to resist 
getting drunk, for he is never affected in the least, while others pass out 
around him. Alcibiades says, •no man has ever yet seen Socrates 
drunk.•2:zo On his military campaigns, Socrates perfonned •many 
marvelous feats• of great physical stamina and fortitude.221 During the 
winters, the other soldiers, including Alcibiades, took great care to wrap 
themselves up wannly and fill their shoes with extra insulation, while 
Socrates • ... walked out in [the same) weather, clad in just such a coat as 
he was always wont to wear, and he made his way more easily over the 
ice unshod than the rest of (us) did in our shoes. •222 Socrates' ability to 
walk barefoot over the same ice as the others walked wearing insulated 
shoes demonstrates his transcendence of body over and above other 
men. Socrates' trances, especially the one which occurs at the beginning 
of the dialogue thereby causing his delay, also demonstrate his 
219 Plato. Symposium, 219c. 
220 Ibid., 220a. 1he evening eventually erupts into a drinking ).:mty, at the end of which 
(and at the end of the dialogue), Socrates, after having drank a lot himeeJf, puts the 
others who haft paaae d out to bed. 
UlJbid. 
222 Ibid., 202b. 
131 
transcendence of body and complete immersion into matters of the soul. 
Alcibiades relates the occurrence of such a trance that happened on a 
military expedition. Socrates stood in one place from dawn one day until 
dawn the next day immersed in thought while his companions stayed 
outside, observing him to see how long he would remain standing. When 
dawn broke the next day, he simply -walked away.•223 Again, this 
concretizes Socrates', the noble lover's, concern with matters of the soul, 
over and above his own body and indeed the whole physical realm. 
Socrates also shows his courage in battle, saving the life of Alcibiades by 
refusing to leave him. He further shows his hatred of •... any sort of 
honour that is the envied prize of the crowd• by refusing the prize for 
valour which he said should go to Alcibiades. 224 
Alcibiades continues, 
There are many more quite wonderful. things that one could find to 
praise in Socrates: but although there would probably be as much 
to say about any other one of his habits, I select his unlikeness to 
anybody else ... as calling for our greatest wonder. 225 
~~ Ibid.. 220d. We might aaaume that Socrates stood in that place until he bad come to 
the concluaian about that which he was thinking. His companions are awan: or this 
habit or his. When be finally arrives at Agathon•s houee. Agathon eaya. •Here you ~. 
Socrates. Come and sit next to me; I want to share this great thought tbat•s just struck 
you in the porch next door. rm sure that you must have mastered it. or you'd still be 
standing there. • Ibid., 175c-d. 
224 Ibitl.. 216e. 
:125Jbid., 22lc. 
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Again, Alcibiades praises Socrates in contrast to others. He is strange 
and unique among men, i.e., a daimon amongst humanity. Socrates' 
strength of mind and body are presented by Alcibiades as a resistance to 
external forces, such as the cold, physical fatigue, the fear of death, or 
the temptation of Alcibiades himself. 226 Socrates is indifferent to the 
particular and the material. He has the power to detach himself from 
bodily matters and exist within. The brilliance of Socrates' body is its 
capacity to endure and sunnount and even exclude bodily sensation and 
external causes. Thus, while Diotima (and Plato in general), presents the 
body as a hindrance toward the pursuit of the universal, here the body is 
given a more positive emphasis. 'Ibe body has the power not to be 
affected by the infinite particulars, thus allowing the soul to pursue the 
universal. 
Furthennore, Socrates, through his use of the dialectic, inspires 
this love of the universal good in others. He is the prime example of the 
good lover in his possession of true opinion, i.e., the realization of his 
own ignorance, and his desire to possess the eternal good, seeking it out 
in eternal things. In addition to this, Socrates cultivates the same desire 
in others; i.e., he instigates the same attraction toward the proper and 
eternal objects of love. Insofar as he and others cultivate this love, they 
:z:n; 'Ibis is a pre-stoical manifestation of the inward shift of the infinite will aa the 
infinite power to reeiat external caueea. 
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win the favour of god, and thus, immortality, the necessary but not 
sufficient condition whereby the eternal good can be attained. 
Socrates is the model for what love should be of, and for how one 
should conduct oneself in accordance with that love. Furthermore, 
Socrates, as the personification of Love the spirit, shows how love 
functions. Socrates is indeed a •gift from god", and like love itself, he too 
manifests a kind of grace, whereby through his use of dialectic and 
conversation, he elevates others with him out of the cave toward the 
eternal good that is humanity's completion and salvation. Alcibiades 
believes this as well. 
[Socrates' speeches) ... are the only speeches which have any sense 
in them; and secondly, that none are so divine, so rich in images of 
virtue, so largely- nay, so completely- intent on all things proper 
for the study of such as would attain both grace and worth. 227 
Chapter 1 presented us with the notion of love. Chapter 2 grounded the 
nature and function of this spirit in dialectical form. In Chapter 3, we 
now have this love demonstrated for us, concretized in the behaviour and 
conduct of him who was indeed, true love personified. 
:J~ Ibid.. 222a. 
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CONCLUSION 
In a word, the unity of the Plato's Symposium is its continuity. I 
proposed at the beginning of this work that the unity of the Symposium 
would be present at the end, for the demonstration of a continuity is a 
progressive affair. What I believe to be the most important threads of 
continuity within the Symposium have been traced in this work from 
their rhetorical beginnings to their respective dialectical completions. 
Each speech, as I have shown, contributes to the emergence of the 
nature and function of love. 
Love has emerged throughout the progression of the dialogue as 
the dynamic mediator between god and man, a mediator who is 
necessary for the attainment of salvation. Phaedrus introduces the idea 
that love is intrinsically related to conduct, moving one to act virtuously 
even when he/she lacks lmowledge of virtue. This contribution 
anticipates the later explicit identification of love with true opinion by 
Diotima. Phaedrus also introduces right from the beginning the 
important notion of immortality, which is dialectically realized by Diotima 
to be a necessary condition for love itself. Pausanias elaborates on this 
notion of conduct, suggesting that the relationship between lover and 
beloved be based upon that which is etemal, i.e., that the quality of love 
is dependent upon the quality of its object. Although confused in the 
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sense that the lover is placed below the beloved in his desire for the 
beloved's body, as we have seen, the doctrine of conduct introduced by 
Pausanias makes acute the question of the proper object of love. 
Eryximachus universalizes the notion of attraction introduced by 
Pausanias in his holding that all things, not merely human beings, 
exhibit this force. Using the analogy of medicine, he claims that some 
attractions are good, thus creating healthy states, while others are bad, 
yielding sickness. More importantly, however, Eryximachus is the first 
explicitly to place love between humanity and divinity. Love is that 
intennediate power which makes possible communion between human 
beings and god. Furthennore, Eryximachus claims that the cultivation of 
the proper love, wherever it occurs, contributes to the salvation of the 
cultivator by promoting that which God loves. In the speech of 
Aristophanes, the notion of desire becomes acute, in particular, the 
desire for completion. 'Ibe moral of his myth is that human beings are 
incomplete as a result of our past impiety. Love is the desire for the 
completion that we once had and the mode through which we can attain 
salvation. 'lbe speech of Agathon marks the transition from rhetoric to 
dialectic. Agathon reveals the importance of definition, and although he 
himself fails to employ a proper method of definition, he sets the stage for 
the speech of Socrates wherein the dialectical method takes hold to 
ground the previous rhetorical notions of love. 
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After his initial questioning of Agathon, whereby Socrates proves 
that love is not a god, Socrates recounts his past discussions with 
Diotima. Through dialectical reasoning, Diotima arrives at the definition 
of love as a spirit between God and man, possessing the qualities of both. 
As such, love is the perfect mediator between God and man since • ... God 
with man does not mingle. -228 Love, as a spiritual being, both brings 
humanity to God and God to humanity. Furthermore, love, as desire, is 
dialectically established to be the desire for the eternal possession of the 
good. In addition to Diotima's definition of the nature and function of 
love, the speech relates the anagogical progression of the soul in terms of 
a ladder, similar to Plato's line in the Republic. One proceeds from the 
desire for a particular manifestation of beauty onward to the desire for 
the form of beauty itself. Love is that great power which helps one ascend 
this ladder, and upon reaching its summit one achieves immortality, 
which is itself a condition for the possibility of loving and attaining the 
good. 
Tile speech of Alcibiades shows this perfect love in action through 
the conduct of Socrates, who himself is love personified. Alcibiades' 
speech emends Pausanias' confused doctrine of conduct in accordance 
with love: Socrates' concern is with the universal only and thus the 
~21 Plato, Symposium, 203. 
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desire for the physical drops out of the picture. Socrates is the highest 
example of one who creates and cultivates the proper love in accordance 
with Eryximachus' doctrine of attraction. Thus, insofar as Socrates 
inspires his beloveds with desire for the good, his is pious and thus 
contributes to his own salvation as well as that of the beloved. 
In taking the whole of the dialogue as a progressing dialectic, one 
achieves a much fuller account of the nature and function of love. 
Furthennore, Plato's doctrine of love is extremely important to his 
thought as a whole. Plato suggests in the Symposium that one cannot 
attain the good through one's own rational activity, whereas in the 
Republic, there is no explicit dynamic that brings one up the line. There 
is help in the Symposium in love, a mediating spirit without which 
salvation is impossible. St. Augustine criticizes the Platonists, claiming 
that they were • ... bloated with the most outrageous pride ... •229, in their 
belief that they could attain the good through their own rational activity. 
Augustine says that the Platonists • ... see the goal that they must reach, 
but cannot see the road by which they are to reach it ... •230 The 
Symposium of Plato separates Plato from this criticism of the Neo-
Platonists in that for Plato, spiritual help is needed to reach the good. 
'lbe Symposium, therefore, is a crucial dialogue not only in relation to 
:m Augustine, C9nfesaiona. R. S. Pine-Coffin (trans.) (En&land: Penguin Gmup, 1961), 
p. 144. 
138 
Plato's doctrine of love, but more importantly, because love is necessary 
for salvation, the dialogue is necessarily tied to Plato's all-important Hne 
and cave analogies in the Republic, as well as to many of his other works. 
Love itself is a dynamic, and each of the speeches of the 
Symposium brings this out in its own way. The speeches dialectically 
culminate in that of Socrates which grounds and emends the rhetorical 
framework that precedes it. The speeches together show that salvation is 
a progression from lack to completion, and the mediating dynamic of love 
aids in the fulfillment or humanity giving rise to immortality. In reading 
the Symposium as a progressing dialectic, seeing each speech as an 
integral part of the unfolding spiritual nature and salvific function or 
love, we can fonnulate a doctrine that is complete and of exceeding 
importance to Plato's thought as a ·whole. The Symposium, therefore, is 
significant for the process of unifying Plato's ideas as they appear 
throughout the whole Platonic corpus, since its doctrine stands in 
essential relation to the other dialogues, in particular to the Republic. So 
too within the Symposium itself unity must be kept in mind as one 
progresses through the dialogue, understanding how each s~h of the 
Symposium contributes to the revelation of the unity of that which itself 
unifies, namely love. 
~30 lbid., p. 154. 
139 
BIBUOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources: 
Plato. Lysis. Symposium. Gomias. W.R.M. Lamb (trans)Vol. 166 of l.Q!;]2 
Classical Library. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 1967). 
Plato. Plato: the Collected Dia}ogues Including the Letters. Trans. Hugh 
Tredennick. (eds) Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1989). 
Plato. Symposium. (ed) Sir Kenneth Dover. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1980). 
Plato. Symposium, Robin Waterfield (trans.). (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994). 
Secondaru Sources: 
Anderson, Daniel E. The MasJcs of Dionysos: A Commentary on ptato's 
SUmDOSium. (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 
1993). 
Augustine, Confessjons. R. S. Pine-Coffin (trans.) (England: Penguin 
Group, 1961). 
Bloom, Alan. Lpve and Friendship. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1993). 
Cobb, William. (trans) The Symposium and Phaedn1s. Plato's Erotic 
Dialogues: Translated with Introduction and Commentaries. 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993). 
Dover, K. J .. •AJistophanes' Speech in Symposium,• Journal of HeUenic 
Studies 86 (1966) 41-50. 
140 
Dover, K. J .. •Eros and Nomos (Plato Symposium 182a-18Sc): Bulletin of 
the Institute of Classical Studies 11 (1964) 31-42. 
Epstein, Paul. "The Treatment of Poetry in the Symposium of Plato. • 
Animus 4 ( 1999) [http: //www.mun.ca/ animus/1999vol4/ epstein4 
.htm}. 
Golden, M. •slavery and Homosexuality at Athens. • Phoenix 38 ( 1984) 
308-324. 
Mitchell, Robert Lloyd. The Hymn to Eros: A Reading of Plato's 
SUmposium. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993). 
Nussbaum, Martha. The FraRiUty of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek 
Tragedy and Philosophy. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986). 
Rosen, Stanley. Plato's SymoosiuJD. (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 
1968). 
Ruprecht, Louis A. Symposia: Plato. the Erotic. and Moral Value. 
(Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1999). 




